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Abstract:
The strength and dominance of political society, rather than the weaknesses of
civil society, is arguably one of the primary reasons for massive civil uprising in Egypt
led by independent, unaffiliated members of society. In many cases it appears that civil
society was behind the Egyptian Revolution, although is this the case? Did the
Revolution happen in spite of civil society? Just as the state can be a roadblock to
development and democratization, civil society may also be detrimental to society’s
growth. In this thesis, the development and civil society community is analyzed to
discover the functions of CSOs as well as their own opinions on civil society in the hope
of gaining a more precise and practical understanding of civil society’s role throughout
Egypt. This thesis considers the major forces of civil society, both externally and
internally, to include: local NGOs, international NGOs, USAID, development
contractors, transnational organizations, and youth members of the resistance movement
known throughout this research as “activists.”
Development agencies and foreign governments fund civil society in order to
promote democratization and empower actors outside of the state. However there is a
lack of understanding of what civil society is in the developing context rather than how it
is understood in Western academia and policy. In the developing context civil society is
often not simply a grassroots sector, as is often suggested, and rather an intricate network
of transnational organizations funded by foreign governments or WB and IMF, while
local organizations or NGOs are highly regulated by national government. Essentially
these formal civil society organizations are unable to challenge state dominance due to
the fact that they either work closely with them or are working or the goals of Western
global structures. What the investigative research found is that there is a dynamic,
grassroots, and voluntary group of unaffiliated members of society although they’re not
considered to be civil society by national or foreign governments, and therefore do not
receive funding or assistance like formal civil society. This research and thesis is vital to
the understanding of what civil society is in Egypt and the re-conceptualization of civil
society in the developing world.
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To Midan Tahrir and Beyond
The Twitterverse on #Jan25:
@SandMonkey: Shower, Cargo pants, Hoodie, running shoes, phone charged, cash, ID,
cigs (for jail) and some mace just in case. Am ready! #Jan25
@adamakary: #jan25 protester’s demands: increase in minimum wage, dismissal of
interior ministry, removal of emergency law, shorten presidential term
@Sarahngb: Tahrir square looks scary. Cordons, policemen, fire trucks, CS trucks.
#Jan25
@tarekshalaby: Today’s our day as #CitizenJournalists to cover and share the truth
freely. Regardless of the outcome we are winners cuz we’re a team #jan25
@monasosh: I know this will sound corny, but I have never felt like this is my country
more than now #jan25
@Ghonim: We got brutally beaten up by police people @Jan25
@ashrafkhalil: #Jan25 crowd chanting ‘salmeya’ peaceful
@RamyYaacoub: RT @Sarahngb: Thousands of People still at tahrir square chanting ‘al
sha3b yoreed esqat el nizam’ ‘the people want the system down’
@Ghonim: Egypt after #Jan25 is no way going to be the same as Egypt before it. Today
we proved so many points.
It was the 1st of February 2011 in the late evening. Wearing a galabeya, a
traditional white robe, I awaited anxiously, sitting on my back porch in San Francisco,
California. Having just arrived from Cairo two days before the first day of the uprising, I
was already considering my next flight back. I figured that the final semester of
university could wait. Glued to my laptop, staring at the ensuing events, I tried to stay in
close contact with friends and family. Personally, this was a bittersweet time; I felt that I
needed to be there on multiple fronts, particularly for my family’s safety as well as to join
the movement. My family had never cared for military rule or the Mubarak regime but
had become disenchanted, or jaded, over time and had no intention of flying me in for
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“another flattened protest.” Keeping in close contact is what allowed me to mentally or
spiritually take part, spread awareness in the U.S. (where almost everyone was beyond
confused), and take part in the growing international protests in solidarity with the people
of the so called Arab Spring. I was not present in Cairo during the initial eighteen days of
the uprising, however, I was in the capital for the one-year anniversary as well as spent
several months in Cairo throughout the year of 2012. As a consequence, I only have the
personal accounts of close friends and family members that took part in the eighteen-day
uprising.
As I begin to recall, it was the early morning of February 1st, 2011 in Cairo,
Egypt. The passing month was imprinted onto the minds of every Egyptian as if it were
yesterday. Exhausted from many sleepless nights, we were weary of a security apparatus
of which we feared our entire lives. Buzzing from a constant nerve-racking excitement
that was going on outside our apartments, there was a tension thick enough that it could
have been sliced with a knife. Fearful of the next twenty minutes (let alone what the
future had in store) there was nonetheless also a feeling of pride, a feeling of
accomplishment beyond what any student, manual laborer, banker, engineer, or
unemployed person has ever felt before. This feeling was not related to personal deeds
that only you or your immediate family could reap the benefits; this was instead a feeling
of energetic waves circulating through millions of people with the hope of accomplishing
something greater than their immediate circle and beyond themselves, something that
could (and will) alter the course of Egyptian history. This same energy awoke the restless
youth, many wondering if they could keep this momentum going for at least one more
day.
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At the beginning of each day, it has become typical for the daily mode of thinking
to become more serious as people spend time sifting through social media and news
(local and international). Using Facebook and/or Twitter, the situation is analyzed: Who
was there? What were protesters seeing and hearing? (It was the “go-to” primary news
source). Of course, a week after the beginning of the uprising, the government blocked
social media outlets forcing media users (even the average technologically-capable
individuals) to take advantage of proxy Facebook and Twitter sites. Other thoughts
included: How are we going to get to Tahrir? What is security like? Where will everyone
meet? How will we get home? (And of course, the question on many people’s minds
particularly for the majority who did not spend their nights guarding the square) What in
God’s name am I going to wear? This question may sound irrelevant, but it was just as
important as any other. In other words, what do you wear to protect yourself from policebaton beatings and massive over-crowding or from tear gas and rubber bullets? These
were practical thoughts by the practical revolutionary when considering all the
possibilities of “What can happen today?” and “How can we come out alive in order to
sustain this growing movement?”
In Cairo, Tahrir Square is the place to be. It is a central-blood conduit for reaching
Cairo’s city center, downtown, Mohandeseen, Zamalek, Heliopolis, Maadi, Shubra, and
other areas. Diverse crowds battle from every neighborhood to break police barriers
while wiggling themselves through narrow roads that barely have enough space for a
1980 Fiat, let alone the infamous police “box” truck. Tahrir works as the destination for
every group march or massive protest, not simply because the square is coincidentally
named liberation square in English, but because it is a public space and therefore it can
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hold mass crowds coming in from every surrounding neighborhood; it effects traffic
because it is located near luxurious hotels and the Cairo Museum (for example) that
makes it easy to disturb much of the city’s flow of transportation and tourism; and
because the Square symbolizes the heart of Cairo where crowds offer protection for the
resting revolutionaries who had occupied the square and established a tent city. Tahrir has
now become a microcosm of Egypt, albeit a bohemia, but still a fair representation of
Egypt’s urban youth as well as older generations of men and women.
At this point (February 1st) in the Square, receiving cell phone signals and/or
communication was nearly impossible. Upon arrival to Tahrir one would find civilian
checkpoints (for safety reasons and to ensure the peaceful attitude of the protests)
surrounding the general area and specifically guarding the entrances and exits around the
square. Along with civilian security came many welcoming people tempting those on the
outskirts to join and be a part of what was happening. Separate lines were formed for men
and women that worked toward ensuring a safe experience for all. Anyone who has lived
or visited Egypt will know how rare ordered lines are, for any establishment. The people
in Tahrir are trying to make a point or send a message not just about how non-violent
protesting should be conducted, but also how a crowd of thousands can be well-organized
and civilized, unlike the wild, adrenaline junkie, anarchists the state media had portrayed
them as. Although checkpoints can be seen as threatening, particularly for this police
state, in reality civilian checkpoints are not nearly as threatening because everyone is on
the same “side;” guards even made a point to be kind and courteous during each pat
down.
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Once going passed the checkpoint, your imagination was opened to the
unexpected. Everything looked unfamiliar and unrecognizable to the point that, if it were
not for the well known surrounding sites of the Cairo Museum and KFC (for example),
you would hardly recognize where you were or be able to orient yourself. The square was
packed, beyond anything resembling a fair or carnival. Public space was occupied. The
main square of downtown, normally an orientalist dream or at least a tourist’s favorite
open space amidst the bustling crowded city, was now out of service for its conventional
duties, it felt as if you just passed through an entirely different city in order to get to
Tahrir Square. Yet, it was not the site itself that was jaw dropping, but in fact it was the
people. The crowds of people were actively and composed of mostly young individuals
but all with different backgrounds (conservative and progressive, secular and religious); it
did not matter. All that mattered was that people cooperated with one another in order to
achieve what had been seen as an impossible feat in the past.
Somehow individuals knew how to organize for this movement. People had no
problems giving orders as much as taking orders. The surrounding space was so clean
you may have thought you were in Tahrir Square in 1927. Within the Square, midan,
there were hospital tents, tents for sleeping, tents for making posters, with people of
different ethnicities around them. Venders (no officially recognizable until several weeks
later) sold flags, protester paraphernalia (for example, gas masks for the purpose of
protection from tear gas) food, and water. In some cases food and water were simply
handed out for free to anyone who was thirsty or hungry. There was a real sense of
camaraderie, no matter what your religion, sex, or age was and that is something
Egyptians had never felt on a mass scale before (beyond his or her own neighborhood). It
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is as if our generation had awoken from a three-decade slumber ready to build a future,
ready to take the situation into their own hands, ready to reclaim their individual and
collective rights, and ready to make the mark on society that they had yet to make. As
soon as one person managed to lock eyes with someone else, there was an exchanged
gesture that signaled a need for help with a chore such as cleaning up trash if handed a
trash bag or delivering medical supplies to tents or simply to hoist a flag or poster if
given.
Furthermore, there were sounds of chanting and loud yells in a rhythmic chorus
coming from open mouths of ordinary, modest people. Women, who are rarely allowed to
show their dissatisfaction with their traditional gender role created by the state, were seen
leading chants and putting their hearts and souls into their words. Men, denying their
traditional roles, were seen leading but also, going against the expectation of men’s roles
in society, were following chants, taking the back seat to other leaders, and for once
allowing women to play the integral role that they are normally limited to in a highlypatriarchal society. Moreover, Muslims and Christians were raised together garnering
Bibles and Qurans to demonstrate the community’s cohesiveness and togetherness. The
crowds, similar to what was seen in Tunisia, often yelled “we are one hand,” “down with
the regime,” and “down with military rule” while in between the hallmark chants came
witty, creative, rhyming phrases that displayed Egypt’s world renowned sense of humor.
Smiles and sadness, chants and conversation, everyone had their personal reasons for
being present at the protest, yet the underlying force was to take back their country,
together.
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Recalling further, I pushed my way through the crowds as a feeling of
claustrophobia came over me while the faces of different walks of life passed.
Approaching the epicenter of the Square, I squeezed behind the tea vendor (who was
excitedly yelling in Arabic, “Tea, Tea, have a cup for Egypt”) to climb a ledge and
improve my vantage point. With just a few more feet of elevation I was able to better
differentiate who was who within this microcosm of Egypt. Whether it were young,
urban, middle-class men chanting creative cheers in rhymes or a group of women, halfveiled half-not, calling for their equal rights within the new constitution or bearded men
congregating on a colorful stage with loud speakers promoting the Islamist political
agenda, one key conclusion was obvious: No one knew what they were doing. For almost
all who were in attendance, the past year was the first time for many Egyptians to bask in
the fight for the human right of freedom and of political speech.
Fast-forwarding to the summer of 2012 (September to be precise) Egypt had a
democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi. Not coincidentally, he is the
Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) candidate from the Freedom and Justice party. The MB,
(banned for decades up until this Revolution) played a solid, yet dominatingly active role
in the uprising, making sure their presence was felt in Tahrir Square and elsewhere. It just
so happens now that their candidate is our current President (something I had mulled
about and was initially confused about when they were passing around political pins
throughout Tahrir months before even a decision to have an election). The foundation of
Tahrir, its cohesiveness, is barely intact and I cannot help but wonder if this was the
result of its politicization. I keep asking myself, were the Egyptians in Tahrir Square and
in other city centers of Egypt playing the role of civil society? Or did the Square become
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a place to enhance political agendas? If the Square has changed over time, how and why
did it happen and can we actually call it civil society? And really, what is civil society in
Egypt? What are these social and political dynamics of Egyptian civil society that allows
our society to be confused and unaware of who is with whom? And so, I went back to
Cairo, in search of these difficult answers, interested to know what kind of role major
forces of civil society were playing in the uprising, and whether they are the same people
who were in the Square just a year earlier lining up side by side, with arms ringed
together, and in unison chanting: “Down with the military dictatorship.”

Introduction
Egypt has, and always will be, the subject of a variety of interpretations of
history, politics, and culture. This is especially the case considering that Egyptian society
is seven-millennia old and is at the crossroads of the African and Asian continent.
Whether one ponders about the construction of the great Pyramids of Giza or the many
stories surrounding the three Abrahamic faiths, Egypt has reserved its place in the history
of human development. As an Egyptian American, this country is my home because it is
where I was born and where I lived until I was eighteen. I was raised with ancient
Christian and Islamic Egyptian histories since childhood. Of course, I never fully realized
the geo-political significance of my home and I certainly never grew up looking at the
country through an anthropologic lens. Arguably, I still do not. Yet there I was, January
25th 2011, nearly finished with my undergraduate degree, not knowing I would be
recalling this memory for my master’s thesis, and I was watching what would quickly
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become the Egyptian Revolution on my laptop from the sunny porch of a shared
apartment in San Francisco.
My initial reaction quickly discredited the relevance of civil resistance and
protest, putting it down to an increasingly lower standard of living for most Egyptians.
From the millennium to 2010, the decade was marked by a flurry of protests that called
for increased individual rights but were quickly squashed. A few days later, the
movement grew, and the majority of people gathered in Tahrir (liberation) Square were
protesting against President Hosni Mubarak and his cabinet, which had held on to power
for thirty years. To witness the socio-political eruption through the Western news
stations, yet to be far away and to hear the chanting through my computer the whole
situation was surreal on a number of levels. In my gut, it felt impossible that the President
Mubarak, who has been hailed as the Pharaoh, the Father, the great leader who has
“provided” peace with Israel, would allow himself to be seen as an enemy of the people.
Yet for all of this, the calls for protest were not that surprising on many levels: Egypt had
been in a political and economic downturn for a decade while it implemented neo-liberal
policies that caused the quality of life for a majority of Egyptians to decrease.
One year later, after a thousand Egyptian deaths, even more injuries, supposed
sectarian violence, state sponsored violence, the ousting of Hosni Mubarak along with the
National Democratic Party (the one party that has ruled Egypt), and the state continues to
be in disarray. I found myself attending the one-year anniversary of the Revolution in the
epicenter of Cairo, Tahrir Square. Nearly one million strong in the country’s capital and
the Revolution felt all but finished. The choking smell of teargas was not there to torment
civilians. The images of police and military were non-existent. The passionate,
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revolutionary spirit felt fresh, almost as if I had never left for the U.S. to study the year
prior to the outbreak.
While some individuals and groups treated the day as a time to celebrate, many
felt that the trials and tribulations of Egyptian citizens were beginning to seem like a lost
cause, as if the Revolution had not been realized. Besides the ousting of Mubarak and
members of his authoritarian regime, they were quite correct, much had gone unchanged.
Pushing my way through the crowds, and feeling claustrophobic, the faces of many
different walks of life passed. Approaching the epicenter of the Square I squeezed behind
the tea vendor, who was excitedly yelling in Arabic, “Tea, Tea, have a cup for Egypt.” I
climbed a ledge to improve my vantage point. With just a few more feet of elevation I
was able to better differentiate who was who within the microcosm of Egypt that was
Tahrir Square. Whether it were young, urban, middle class kids chanting creative cheers
in rhymes or a group of women, half veiled half not, calling for their equal rights within
the new constitution or bearded men congregating on a colorful stage with loud speakers
promoting the Islamist political agenda, one key conclusion was obvious: No one knew
what they were doing. For almost all who were in attendance, the past year was the first
time for many Egyptians to bask in the human right of freedom of political speech. Yet,
with the new in coming freshness of political freedom came skepticism that took time for
most Egyptians to accustom themselves.
Watching, listening, and joining with individuals and groups conversing, sharing
active dialogue, enthusiastically conveying frustration on their faces and hands, it was
clear that most shared similar general inquiries that friends, family, and I had on our
minds: Who will lead Egypt next? What does the future hold? How will the country be
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governed with a bloated bureaucracy; high unemployment; and without strong
institutions, government, civil society and other key factors of a fully functioning state?
The Egyptian military that runs a significant portion of the economy is known as the
government’s armed wing; it quickly took the role of leader and stabilizer in order to
oversee the transitional and election period that approached in the summer of 2012 and
now is in charge of the state. For a country that was once considered by global financial
institutions to be semi-stable, on the rise, and with a GDP growth rate of up to six and
seven percent in the last decade, the conditions of the state are unnerving, if not bleak.
The basis of this research is to determine what kind of state Egypt is, post-revolution, and
what societal forces have a stake in filling the power vacuum left behind by the former
thirty-year president in order to ultimately decipher what and who compose Egyptian
civil society.
The key elements of this puzzle require an unraveling of the relationship between
the state, political society, and civil society. First this means analyzing what “the state” is
both theoretically and practically. For Egypt, understanding the state is a complex task.
The distinguishing lines between political and civil society are unclear as certain social
forces play a dual role. In the Egyptian case, political society is made up of the military,
the government led by the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Freedom and
Justice Party, the state’s security forces, and a plethora of newly founded or revitalized
political parties yearning for a seat, or representation, in the recently elected parliament.
The most relevant force within political society, besides the military, is the newly delegalized, extremely organized, Islamic based political party: the Muslim Brotherhood
(MB) or the Ikhwan. The state, in this case, is a tool for cultural and political coercion

17

used by the ruling party, known up until now as the military and the newly elected
government dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Civil society in Western academic
literature cites civil society as a democratic, grassroots sector of the nation-state,
providing Western governments the inspiration for writing policy that supports civil
society organizations (CSOs) in developing nations. Still, is this definition misconstrued
or misinterpreted, when civil society in Egypt does not appear in the same light? In order
to achieve cultural and political dominance, civil society can also be used as a tool for
cultural and political coercion. The strength and dominance of political society, rather
than the weaknesses of civil society, are seen as primary reasons for massive civil
uprising led by independent, non-affiliated members of society. Just as the state can be a
roadblock to development and democratization, however, civil society forces may also be
detrimental to society’s growth. In this thesis, the development and civil society
community is analyzed to discover the functions of CSOs as well as their own opinions
on civil society in the hope of gaining a more precise and practical understanding of civil
society’s role throughout Egypt. The claim made in this thesis considers the major forces
of civil society, both externally and internally, to include: local NGOs, international
NGOs, USAID, development contractors, transnational organizations, and youth
members of the resistance movement known throughout this research as the “activists.”
After investigative research, it has been determined that the needs, functions,
and dynamics of the major forces (or social groups) make up the state of Egypt. It is, I
argue, especially important to understand who the agents of power are in this tumultuous
time, particularly within the context of this movement against the former regime. Are
civil society organizations (CSOs) the groups that organized the Revolution or did the
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Revolution occur in spite of civil society? The purpose of the Revolution was not only to
alter the status quo, but also to recreate, reestablish, and remodel the plan for Egypt’s
growth as a developed state and society. Under Mubarak, there was no such plan. While
it may have appeared this way on paper, with Egypt receiving the second highest amount
of U.S. foreign aid, the country functioned under a patronage system that cared for the
interests of those in power. While civil society is meant to challenge this system, CSOs
have functioned under the dictatorship and many arguably are either not capable or are
not interested in applying pressure on government. This research and thesis is vital to the
understanding of what civil society is in Egypt in an attempt to distinguish between the
various social forces of the state, and whether they actually conduct the work of civil
society in principle.
The plan of this thesis is as follows: First a historical overview and backdrop of
contemporary Egypt leading up to the beginning of the Revolution will be provided. The
literature review will magnify the varying interpretations of the state, its function, and
what it is should be projected as in the case of Egypt. Second, the root and many
meanings of civil society will be put in to context in order to better conceptualize its role
in Egypt’s society in reality. Following, the methodology will include an outline of the
description of sample subjects, access to subjects, the recruitment procedure, the subject
consent process, the positives and limitations of my research, as well as the potential risks
and benefits to research subjects. The following sections will analyze the primary
research and political cartoons from post-Revolution, followed by the discussion chapter.
I will present the research and interview results completed during my stay in Egypt while
the discussion will be utilized for delving into the research more deeply.
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Historical Overview of Contemporary Egypt
The nation-state of Egypt, also known as the Arab Republic of Egypt, is located in
northeastern Africa and is home to the largest population in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA). Being a transcontinental nation1 Egypt, in the modern world, had been
as a leader of political, economic, and social movements throughout the region. With a
vast historical background, ancient languages and religions, it is particularly interestingand puzzling as to why Egypt has in the last three decades followed a downward spiral of
political, economic, and social erosion. With the great pyramids and pharaohs in Egypt's
rearview mirror, the once prosperous nation is now at a crucial fork in the road in 2012.
Just this past year, January 2011, Egypt underwent a revolution that attempted to throw
out the ruling party and president, Hosni Mubarak, after nearly thirty years of "almost
democratic" authoritarian rule. Beginning with a brief history of how the state of Egypt
has come to be, this section will attempt to outline the logic in which the leading party,
the military, The National Democratic Party (NDP), and its president, has controlled the
political, social and economic spheres of life throughout the country in order to keep
itself at the forefront of power.

Egypt in the Modern world
Before the modern world and birth of the Republic of Egypt the region became
home to many notable colonizers, giving way to the Greek, Roman, Arab, Ottoman,
French and British empires. Egypt's relationship with the international community had

1

Egypt geographically resides both on the northeastern corner of the African
continental shelf and the Asian continent.
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always been one of dependence until the early 20th century2. Following the First World
War, Saad Zaghlul and the Wafd party led the first Egyptian nationalist movement of
their modern history in an attempt to revolt against the British Empire. Though the
British government issued a unilateral declaration of Egypt's independence in 1922, the
replacement kingdom under King Farouk would rule for decades of autocratic and
neocolonial rule. Britain's continued military involvement along with the King Farouk's
constant involvement in the parliament led to a 1952 coup de tat or military revolution,
depending on whom you speak to. What some consider to be a revolution can also be
understood as a bloodless coup led by the Free Officers Movement led by the top youth
military leaders: Muhammad Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Anwar El Sadat. This
change in power would open the doorway to an Egyptian led Egypt for the first time in
thousands of years, a period of modern Egyptian history mired with extreme highs and
lows, and a newly politicized military junta leadership that has ruled Egypt to this day.
General Muhammed Naguib became the first president of Egypt while also

Egypt’s historical character has many faces due to their extensive colonial background.
Egypt has failed to be ruled by its own people dating back to Ancient Egypt. Prior to the
mid-twentieth century, imperial powers in Egypt consisted of British, French, Ottoman,
Arab, Roman, and Greek/Macedonian rulers. Under the Ptolemaic and Roman era Egypt
was utilized as an agricultural breadbasket for the Mediterranean powers. Throughout the
middle ages, and as a result of the spread of Islam, various Arab rulers ruled Egypt
particularly the Fatimid and Mamluk empires. The early modern era gave way to
Ottoman and French rule who were keen on controlling Eastern trade routes. Ottoman
rule lasted from 1517 to 1882 though the French occupied Egypt for a short time. The
region acted as an important Ottoman governorate though on several attempts were made
to become autonomous. The French Emperor, Napoleon, interrupted Ottoman rule by
propagating himself and his empire to be a liberator of Egypt from the Ottomans although
his primary goals were to disrupt British trade routes, to control the Mediterranean, and
build a canal in Suez to connect the east and west (Mediterranean and Red Seas) sea
trade. British rule lasted from 1882 until 1936 when the last of Britain’s military presence
was expelled, though advisors were kept in the government until Egypt’s 1952 military
revolution.
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declaring Egypt a republic in 1952. These leaders implemented land reform that would
attempt in spread wealth to the citizens who were kept in poverty by the colonial
monarchy. Yet at the same time however, most citizens who appeared to have gained
wealth throughout the period of colonization would lose much of their status in the
country.
With Nasser's effort to create a more egalitarian society, much of the population
became polarized, as the educated population felt that they were being punished for being
educated. Only two years later, the real architect of the Free Officers Movement, Gamal
Abdel Nasser and his followers would force Naguib into house arrest for his disapproval
of Nasser's ideas of land reform and policy. Nasser would then become the president and
nationalist figure of Egypt beginning in 1956. Nasser's presidency quickly led to the
complete withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal zone, nationalizing the Suez
Canal months later. According to Said Aburish in his work, Nasser: The Last Arab,
Nasser’s disregard for opposition political parties, and his insistence on one national
movement replacing the party system, permitted him to lead many major projects with
undisputed power. This move gained Nasser national prominence, becoming a symbol for
independence in the Middle East, as no one questioned his leadership. This period of rule
under Nasser has been championed by some and loathed by others. Following an
assassination attempt on Nasser's life during his speech celebrating Britain's withdrawal,
he ordered one of the largest political crackdowns in Egyptian history- arresting
approximately twenty thousand people made up of Muslim Brotherhood members,
Communists, Wafd party followers, and any one else who opposed Nasser's rule
(Aburish: 2004: pg. 53-55). With no opposition, Nasser quickly became the undisputed
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leader of Egypt. He would then lead Egypt into a long period of war with Israel becoming
a regional figure of the Arab world3 for the regions independence movements against
colonizers. Nasser's Egypt became heavily militarized under their close friendship with
the Soviet Union, as the country became the prototypical cold war proxy state (Aburish:
2004: pg.272). Nasser's regional prominence allowed for Egypt to become the
powerhouse of the Arab world. They became leaders in military strength and society as
the entertainment industry boomed in Egypt's favor. Though, Nasser's last war with Israel
in 1967 led to Egypt losing control of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza strip. His
presidency, filled with highs and lows, took a negative turn, as he was unable to unite the
Arab world under his Pan-Arab policies. Failure to oust Israel indefinitely would put
Egypt in a position of weakness that they would never recover from.
Nasser’s death and eventual end to his rule resulted in leadership change within
the party as Anwar Sadat, a former leader of the Free Officers movement, became the
next president of Egypt in 1970. Sadat played a large role in changing Egypt's cold-war
alliance with the USSR to the United States, as the U.S. government was able to convince
Sadat that the only super power that could create peace between Israel and Egypt was
America. Sadat would continue this transformation by creating a new economic reform
policy, known as Infitah, which opened the doors to free and open trade as well as private
investment. His policies also opened the door to the development industry as USAID
established their assistance program in Cairo. In 1973 Sadat led a surprise attack on
Pan-Arab policies focused on the unification of the Arab world and promoted Arab
nationalism. The ‘Nasserist’ ideology, identified with socialist policies, defined panArabism throughout the 1960’s. Nasser attempted to create a pan-Arab state that
included Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, however the union failed to organize under one leader as
Nasser sought to be the leader of a unified Arab state. Pan-Arabism was especially
weakened due to Israel’s demoralizing victory in 1967 over the allied Arab states.
3
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Israeli forces in order to re-occupy the Sinai Peninsula leading to heavy U.S.
involvement.
Only four years later Sadat would be pushed by President Carter to make peace
with Israel, following with a historic visit of the first Arab leader in the Jewish state and a
final peace agreement in 1979. Sadat's peace movement received little support from the
Arab world but was heavily supported by most Egyptians, as he was able to regain Sinai
with some dignity. Two years later, the Muslim fundamentalists he had attempted to keep
quiet throughout his rule would assassinate President Sadat. His death was then followed
by the rule of the party he created, the National Democratic Party (NDP), as well as a
thirty-year period of rule by his former Air Force commander, Hosni Mubarak.
Hosni Mubarak took over as the undisputed leader of an even weaker Egypt.
Following the peace treaty, Egypt was kicked out of the Arab league while losing its
place in Arab history as the most powerful force in the region. Mubarak's thirty year
reign of presidency saw virtually no dispute with Israel, a re-recognition of Egypt in the
Arab League, a continued relationship with the United States, even at the end of the cold
war, a continued economic policy of free trade and private investment, and the same
political government crackdown on all opposition seen under Nasser and Sadat. On paper
their were was extensive economic growth that failed to reach the majority of society.
The two-year period prior to the Egyptian revolution in 2011 saw the worst
unemployment rates under Mubarak. Endemic corruption and authoritarian governance
resulted in a wealthier upper crust of society while the middle class shrunk, allowing the
inevitable rise in poverty.
The logic of the state affects society in numerous ways and certainly has
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destabilized civil society. Although there are over fifteen thousand non-governmental
and/or civil organizations in Egypt, a number growing rapidly post-revolution, the
recently passed law in 2002 (Law No. 84) greatly prohibits the freedom of these
organizations. The law places great legislative restrictions on them while ultimately
taking away from the spirit of being a democratic institution and being of the people.
These legislative restraints are aimed at administrating/controlling the funding and NGO
capabilities but have the adverse effect of stunting Egypt’s social activism and civil
progression. Additionally, NGO’s must have government officials on their decisionmaking boards in order to oversee the work of the organization and its congruence with
the logic of the state. The very foundation of an NGO is broken with certain restrictive
laws, such as the law No. 84. NGO’s are meant to be independent from any direct control
of a public authority, they are often non-profit, they are not associated to a specific
political party or campaign, and they are non-violent and non-criminal. Under certain
articles of Law 84, the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (MISA) actually grants
influential rights and authority of the state over the operations of NGO’s in Egypt – a
direct infringement to their universal right to freedom of association. Article 11 in law 84
forbids the “threatening (of) national unity, violating public order or morals, or calling for
discrimination between citizens because of race, origin, color, language, religion or
creed.” When a country prohibits its own people’s ability to speak, meet, and work
collaboratively, they are devastating their own social progression and cohesion –
ultimately, imprisoning the Egyptian people’s rights to freedom of association and
expression. The state’s meddling in the affairs of civil society is a major factor behind
social stagnation and how the state has controlled the social affairs of its citizens.
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The historical background of modern day Egypt is a necessary tool in
understanding the logic in which the state runs its political, economic, and social policy.
Un-democratic rule amongst its own citizens, deep relationships with external powers,
and a corrupt system of governance has been central to the NDP and the Military Junta
ruling the country. In 2011, in Mubarak's thirtieth year in power, the Egyptian people
staged a revolution that would finally oust the thirty-year ruler out of his post. Since the
ousting of Mubarak, Egypt has endured a tumultuous transitional period filled with
human rights abuses, civil disobedience, a lack of security, the election and disbandment
of parliament, and the election of new President Mohamed Morsi. The reasons behind
why the movement continues, with citizens applying intense pressure on government,
will be made clear throughout this paper.

Literature Review: The Transformation of “State” and “Civil Society”
For thirty years, the Mubarak regime oppressively ruled Egypt as a continuation
of a military dictatorship instilled during the 1952 military “revolution.” It was not until
January 25th 2011 that popular civil resistance and disobedience erupted in Cairo and
surrounding governorates, which led to the ousting of the former president Hosni
Mubarak and many of his supporters. Although many rogue members of the former
ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) were eventually knocked out of leadership roles,
the existence of a counter-revolution continues through the political survival of an
authoritarian system. A state with an authoritarian system was bound to have a serious
power vacuum without its head leadership. The group who believes they can fill the void
of political leadership in hopes of instilling a more socially-conscious government is the
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Muslim Brotherhood (MB), once an illegal organization built on the religious principles
of Islam. With crippled institutions and an overpowering military, the current government
behind the newly-elected President Morsi is battling to facilitate a constitute assembly
(that is currently tasked with writing a constitution that represents all Egyptians), create
parliamentary elections, alleviate the painful blow of an inflated economy, and attempt to
fulfill the demands of the revolutionary movement, all the while fulfilling the political
needs of his respective party (the Freedom and Justice Party).
For this master’s thesis, research has been conducted that will identify what the
state of Egypt looks like in terms of the new structure and centers of power, along with
what the varying political and social dynamics of civil society are in Egypt. Some key
questions are: a) Who are the varying influential actors and are these actors working for
the collective advancement of society or do they have their own interests while being a
coercive tool for the state? b) What does civil society look like in Egypt? In order to
counter the recent literature on state-society relations that suggests that empowering civil
society will result in democratization, the theoretical development of both the state and
civil society over time will be presented.
What is the state and civil society in the Egyptian (North African) context?
Certainly understanding the political and social dynamics of the “Arab,” “North African”
state can open the doors to understanding what is civil society in Egypt. What is often
left out of the discussion throughout this transformation is how there are sharp
differences in state development, particularly when looking at “underdeveloped,”
“developing,” and “developed” nations. Central authority varies from state-to-state
depending on the historical and contemporary context. Unfortunately, the academic field
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in the “developed” world has painted the discussion of the modern state by comparing
Western nations (Europe and the U.S.), or the developed world, to the Global South or
developing world. States with a less legitimate or encompassing central authority are
interpreted as “weak” or having “failed.” This presents fundamental problems for the
analysis of the state in the context of developing countries when they are compared in a
developed world context.
With tomorrow filled with uncertainty, this thesis will look to determine what the
future holds for Egypt, particularly between the shifting political and social dynamics of
civil society within the State. This literature review will first take a look at the varying
interpretations of the State, its function, and what I have become comfortable to
theoretically describe as the Egyptian state. Second, the root and many meanings of civil
society will be put in to context in order to better conceptualize its role in Egypt’s society.
This literature review will be organized as follows: a) classical definitions and
interpretations of the State, b) classical definitions and interpretations of civil society, c)
problems with contemporary definitions of civil society, and d) interpretations of the state
and civil society in a developing world context. This review of the literature will be used
to identify the common trends and schools of thought. However, most importantly, it will
provide the context, background, and location of where the ideologies of this thesis will
preside.

Classical Definitions and Interpretations of the State
Understanding the dynamics of a civil society warrants a clear understanding of
exactly what the State is, particularly when describing Egypt. The basic online search
took me to The Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy, by Barry
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Jones, providing the etymology of the word State and saying that the term derives from
the Latin, status, or literally social status within a community. The Thomas Barfield’s
Dictionary of Anthropology says that the state is a complex system of human society used
to organize extensive populations and is made up of a “hierarchy of offices associated
with specialized institutions that are financed by a political economy…General categories
of state institution include administrative bureaucracies, legal systems, and military and
religious organizations. Such institutions represent different sources of power- economic,
political, military, and ideological” (Barfield, pg.445).
One of the most commonly accepted interpretations is Max Weber’s definition of
the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, Gerth and Mills, 1948:
78). With this interpretation, the state is often seen as having “legitimate” authority. The
state, or central authority, can legitimately use force to achieve its goals, can use violence
against an individual or a group, can use the legal system to imprison citizens, and can
wage war… and most individuals would agree that the state is legitimate in their actions
and capabilities. According to Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, the state is a product of
reason, a highly rational system of order. With Weber’s definition, the state or central
authority consists of several mechanisms, to create and pass laws, a bureaucracy for
implementing laws or other governmental decisions within state institutions, maintain
local security with a police force that maintains a prison system, and finally, to secure the
borders with armed forces of the state against external threats. These mechanisms are the
staple functions of the state, however, some sociologists have extended state institutions
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to nationalized departments, for instance the Postal Service, or as seen in Europe, health
and education services.
The state has developed over the twentieth century to become the most dominant
form of characterizing and controlling territory and people. Still, there are various forms
of the state that must be discussed before demonstrating the type of state Egypt has
become in the Twenty-First Century. The most notable among these is the stateless
society, or Nuer society, discussed by E.E. Evans-Pritchard in the, Nuer, a Description of
the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People. Pritchard’s
research in Africa recognized a society consisting of forty distinct tribes that had no
government and no legal system while handing no special responsibilities to selected
members of society. Decisions that affected their society as a whole were reached
through informal means of discussion between different members of each tribe. The Nuer
society is stateless because it lacks a formal governing body capable of legitimizing force
or control over society.
The feudal state, best seen as an early developer of the modern state, lacks a
central authority with legitimate control over society. Although monarchs ruled feudal
states, with ultimate power in the hands of a king or queen, control over territory and
military was in the hands of governors and lords of a particular region. Power was
dispersed throughout society allowing aristocrats to rule their territory in the name of the
monarch. It was not until the Seventeenth Century where it is apparent that the French
monarchy developed a centralized authority over its territory, however, centralized
authority and the beginning of the modern state could not develop until the Nineteenth
Century when transportation and communication progressed and expanded. The modern
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state is the centralized state, which characterizes the majority of nation-states in this
world. The modern state consists of a central power, or government, with an increased
role within the state, such as greater influence on the economy, military power, and
overall control. The modern state is a heavily scrutinized, researched, and debated
phenomenon as centralized authority takes on responsibility for the well being of society.
Still, modernity of the state does not imply that central authority will function in the best
interests of all members of the state, as governments have been known to represent the
interests of those in power.
Pluralist theories of the state act as an institutional referee that allows all
competing groups within society to have an equal opportunity in the governmental/policy
decision-making process. Governmental power is divided into various competing
agencies rather than from a central authority. Societal power is decentralized and is
wielded by competing, diverse societal forces that equally share influence. With a
plethora of competing groups working for their own interests, the state coordinates
differences between conflicting interests in the hope of promoting a well-balanced and
shared existence. The state in this society is often influenced by democratic values and
principles that empower average individuals and groups to accomplish as much political
power as their lives would permit them. The political process for policy making is reliant
on the political activity of competing and associated groups, as it is their responsibility to
advocate and lobby towards the public, government representatives, and other groups
with similar interests. Arnold Rose, a pluralist theorist, asserted “political power is
distributed over as many citizens working through their associations as want to take
responsibility for power, through the voluntary association the ordinary citizen can
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acquire as much as power in the community or nation as their free time, ability and
inclinations permit them.” Individuals may even associate themselves with varying,
overlapping organizations or causes. This allows power to be distributed among various
organizations and associations without having a dominant, all-powerful force that is
agreed with by all members of society. This model is widely seen as inapplicable to states
besides the U.S. and generates the assumption that formal political institutions play an
unbiased or equitable role in policy making. Ultimately, the state is not an impartial
intermediary and has its own agenda.
The “Elite pluralism theory” led by renowned academics Seymour Martin Lipset
and Robert Dahl’s “Polyarchy” uses the pluralist model to combine elite rule and
democracy. Various competing groups are led, influenced by elites that apply political
pressure for their interests, while minority groups are incapable of having their interests
represented. Democratic principles are shifted away from the interests of the ‘average’
individual and instead surround the competing interests of elites. Political participation
becomes distrusted as powerless groups and individuals lose power and influence to elite
interests.
The “elite theory” contains similar principles to the “elite pluralism theory” in that
elite groups are in control of key resources and institutions, which results in varying
elitist groups holding the majority of power. The intention of the elite class is to always
hold on to power, to any extent necessary. The two driving ideas behind this theory is that
firstly, elites are set apart from the masses due to their resources, education, overall
capability and secondly, that this process is a natural product of society as influential
elites who have authority are seen as necessary leaders. Pareto believed that there are two
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types of elites, one that holds power through governance and the other that is nongoverning and utilizes elitist tools of resources and intelligence to coerce and manipulate
members and groups of society. Mosca emphasized the fact that elite group interests and
values become the dominating principles of society because of the heavy influence on
social and political institutions. Elites are well organized and the masses are not.
Additionally, he asserted that societies are divided into two distinct groups, the rulers and
the ruled. The ruling class is made up of elites that rule and govern the mass population.
In contemporary power elite theory C. Wright Mills understood societal power to reside
in within key social and political institutions that were run by an elite class. At the same
time non-governing elites have a monopoly over economic institutions, control the
majority of the state’s wealth, and therefore can affect policy making in government. He
does not however deem the mass population to be incapable or incompetent, rather, elites
manipulate and exploit the masses in order to keep the mass population in a state of
confusion, ignorance and powerlessness. Furthermore, social groups within the mass
population are able to benefit from the elitist ruling class, which results in divisions
within the powerless.
In conflict theories of the state, the economic sphere is understood as separate and
apart from government institutions; however, Karl Marx believed that having control
over the means of production is the primary principle for the ruling class in society.
Marxist theory suggests that economic activity is central to life and that politics,
education, the legal system, and religious or cultural institutions are a result of
economics. He essentially states that societal power derives from economic dominance
and that controlling the means of production perpetuates class domination of society.
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Marx developed the concept that political warfare is class warfare and that power is a
result of economic domination.
Antonio Gramsci’s intellectual work has been of great service to the
conceptualization of dynamics within the state. The state, Antonio Gramsci asserted is the
unity of political and civil society, both jockeying for political, cultural, and ideological
hegemony. He believed the state to be nothing but a tool or instrument for coercion, a
“super-structure” of hegemonic dominance, and identified two kinds of states that
represented the conditions of Europe. Firstly, the state is a dictatorship, a coercive multifaceted system that dominates over society. Secondly, that the state is the totality of
social, economic, political, and cultural relations that together form a given political and
social order, resulting in a cultural and political hegemony. This dualistic understanding
of the state can also be better understood as Gramsci’s “east vs. west” distinction. In the
east, the state is fully dominant as civil society is seen as “gelatinous”. This kind of state
domination results in civil society being suppressed, which only survives on challenging
state hegemony. In the west, the state and civil society is equal to the state. Civil society
traditionally is a function of the state, which is a tool for coercion and acquiring
hegemonic dominance over the system of governance and power. Gramsci expressed in
his work, The Prison Notebooks, that the state is the unity of civil society and political
society, similarly translated to the state being a combination of hegemony and
dictatorship. From now on, hegemony refers to the domination and coerciveness of the
state and the ruling power within the state- whether economic, political, cultural, etc. For
instance, educational and religious institutions have the ability to be dominant in what is
being taught and “believed” in by the mass population. Furthermore, these institutions are
a function of the state therefore the state is able to have social and political hegemony.
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Ji-Hyang Jang in her article, Weak State, Weak Civil Society, asserts the
theoretical opposite of pluralism by introducing the ‘corporatist’ state. Rather than
Gramsci’s east versus west scenario, they present the discussion on the state as a
“pluralism versus corporatism” scenario. The pluralist state “is viewed as a collection of
individuals occupying particular official roles and as an arena within which societal
actors struggle to ensure the success of their own particular preferences through electoral
pressure and lobbies” (Jang, 2009: 82). The pluralist state is more like a referee, serving
as a facilitator of interest groups and institutions, in order for state hegemony. Inversely,
the state in the “corporatism paradigm is the decisional and authoritative structure linked
with the associationally organized interests of civil society” (Jang, 2009: 82). The
corporatist structure finds a greater role for the state in order to directly manipulate the
economy and the social groups of society. Furthermore, pluralists and corporatists “offer
opposing political remedies and divergent images of the institutional form that such a
modern system of interest representation will take. The former suggest spontaneous
formation, numerical proliferation, horizontal extension, and competitive interaction; the
latter advocate controlled emergence, quantitative limitation, vertical stratification, and
complementary interdependence” (Schmitter 1979: 16). Jang makes the direct
comparison of the corporatist state and several Arab nations, including Egypt. This is
because the state heavily intervenes in the economy, is the primary catalyst for economic
development, and the corporatist state is the only actor that can make the necessary
market and political prescriptions, whether this occurs is another story. The state
(government) then successfully has pinned itself in a “permanent” state of hegemony,
while civil society, as Gramsci pointed out, is “gelatinous”.
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Definitions and Interpretations of Civil Society
What is civil society? The term “civil society” is often employed to describe a
coercive function of the state, or as a challenger and/or an advocator of state hegemony.
Civil society was already a relevant term pre-revolution, particularly when it came to the
overgrown development apparatus that resides in Egypt. Still, the term civil society has
taken on a new relevance in Egypt, post-revolution, especially as social and political
scientists wrestle with the term and its influence on the Arab social movements. Civil
society has taken on different roles and meanings over time and within varying state
structures, which is why I will be highlighting its transformation over time and space.
The etymological roots of civil society, without digging too deeply and with
valuable help, can be found in the foundations of early European society Latin, where
civis means citizen and civitas means civil, the embodiment of community, city, state,
and the body of citizens within it. There are many scholars over time that have indeed
influenced the classical meaning, character, and interpretation of civil society, namely,
Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Hegel, Marx and Gramsci. However it is through the
use of Gramsci’s work on civil society that will represent the majority of classical
interpretations of the term.
In the Prison Notebooks Gramsci argues that the roots of a functioning civil
society, as a superstructure challenging the state, can be traced to the rise of the Catholic
Church and the gradual fall of the Holy Roman Empire. The church had the capability to
challenge state hegemony due to their influence on, for example, growing religious
identity, individualism, social life, and education. Only the church had the power
capabilities of altering state ideology in favor of another hegemonic force, their selves.
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With the church and state hegemony swinging side to side, the state was never fully able
to dominate the church and vice versa. This then created a new space, a space that exists
between hegemonies, where social groups, media, organizations, and religious
institutions could challenge and debate state hegemony.
Gramsci’s valiant attempt in conceptualizing civil society began originally as a
plan to “discover the political, theoretical, and strategic means to organize and mobilize
subordinate groups within society so that they might usher in a new form of state and
order” (Fontana, 1993: 342). For Gramsci, civil society includes the whole of the
ideological, cultural, spiritual, and intellectual life. He did not consider the market or
economics to play a role in civil society and believed civil society to represent the active
and positive moments of historical development. In many ways he considered civil
society to be the “arena of struggle”. Additionally, he claimed that civil society would be
the super-structure capable of challenging the state. By ‘challenging’, Gramsci meant the
swallowing of political society, the end of the state, the altering of a state system and of
political ideology. Gramsci believed the integral state to be civil and political society;
meaning civil society is a part of the state. However, “in his (Gramsci’s) view, civil
society, far from being inimical to the state, is, in fact, its most resilient constitutive
element, even though the most immediately visible aspect of the state is political society,
with which it is all too often mistakenly identified. He was also convinced that the
intricate, organic relationships between civil society and political society enable certain
strata of society not only to gain dominance within the state but also, and more
importantly, to maintain it, perpetuating the subalternity of other strata.” (Buttigieg, pg.
4; 1995) This point of an organic relationship between the civil and the political is
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certainly a key feature of the relationships within the Egyptian state. The supremacy of
an individual social group manifests itself in two ways, firstly, through domination and
secondly, through moral and intellectual leadership. A social group must exercise
leadership before winning governmental power, as it is through that leadership that
ideologies and values can be represented in order to attain the favor of social groups.
However, if it is to “hold power firmly within its grasp, the social group must continue to
‘lead’” (Fontana, 1993: 343).
The primary differences between Gramscian and Hegelian theory regarding the
functions of civil society and the state are that Hegel believed the state to be a natural
phenomenon, one that can be seen as a positive moment in the historical development of
human history. Gramsci believed the state to be none other than an instrument or coercive
tool of the state. Secondly, Gramsci asserted that civil society was ideological, cultural,
spiritual, and intellectual aspects of society, while, Hegel would later critique his
assertion, saying that, the economic-financial sphere of society is also a part of civil
society. Both Gramsci and Hegel believed civil society to be the ethical content of the
state. This is extremely relevant considering Egypt’s civil society is diverse in its ethical
nature while differing in Egypt’s course for the future.
Jeffrey Church has also added to the discussion of civil society by determining the
differences between Rousseau and Hegel, who were particularly fixated on what would
happen to civil society if it included the commercial industry and economic spheres of
life. Church asserts one of Rousseau’s main arguments from the Social Contract, saying,
“human desire in commercial societies has become insatiably expensive and increasingly
detached from genuine political communities” (Church, 2009: 125). Rousseau believed
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that commercial societies ultimately end up with citizens caring more about their
individual welfare over the welfare of others or the community as a whole. Citizens then
become ‘unsatisfied’ with life because of their selfishness, which undermines their own
individual civic participation for the community. Hegel, in the Philosophy of Right,
believed civil society institutions to be the answer to Rousseau’s problem. For Hegel, it is
the goal of these institutions within civil society to curb irrational individual desires in
favor for rational desires of the common good.
State and civil society theories of Fontana, Bobbio, and Buttigieg, believe that
Gramsci’s writings also provide elaborate insight on the functions, players, and on the
capabilities of challenging state hegemony. In congruence with the Gramscian school of
thought, Fontana, in his work Political Space and Hegemonic Power, expresses the
importance of physical space, geography, and a large structural presence. Property and
large structures of the state, along with fortresses and institutions of civil society, are
meant to protect the state. These structures further convolute the presence of the multidimensional super-structure of power, known as the state, in order to increase a veiled
coercion. Fontana asserted “Civil society is envisioned as constituted by multiple and
overlapping spheres. Civil society is not one and harmonious, but a plurality of spaces,
socio-political and physical/territorial” (Fontana,1993: 345). Within the same article, he
explains that, “the greater the structural complexity, the more the ideological systems of
belief and thought are embedded within the population, the less transparent the coercive
nature of the state appears, and the more effective and consequential become the
instruments of persuasion and consent” (Fontana, 1993: 348) Joseph Buttigieg, in the
journal “Boundary 2”, wrote on the contemporary discourse on civil society. Buttigieg
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believed many present theorists have misinterpreted Gramsci’s understanding that civil
society was certainly an important part of the state, as opposed to a separate, anti-state
institution. He asserts in his article that, “Gramsci regarded civil society as an integral
part of the state; in his view, civil society, far from being inimical to the state, is, in fact,
its most resilient constitutive element, even though the most immediately visible aspect
of the state is political society, with which it is all too often mistakenly identified. He was
also convinced that the intricate, organic relationships between civil society and political
society enable certain strata of society not only to gain dominance within the state but
also, and more importantly, to maintain it, perpetuating the subalternity of other strata”
(Buttigieg, 1995: 4).
Classical civil society, as James Ferguson argued in his work Global Shadows:
Africa in the Neoliberal World Order, “still had a rather antique cast to it when I [he] first
encountered it in graduate seminars on social theory.” The classical use of civil society
had seen little alterations from Hegelian, Marxist, and Gramscian theories up until the
mid-twentieth century cold-war period that began the inception of social movements and
particularly throughout the debate of Communist versus Democratic hegemony. Indeed
civil society has been altered to fit the contemporary context and became especially
popular among liberal scholars for the purposes of social movement theory and neoliberal
thought. The following section will discuss the transformation of civil society as a
superstructure of society outside of the political realm, to the more recent belief in
literature and policy that civil society is a democratic arena for challenging state
dominance led by innovative, energetic grassroots initiatives, associations, and
organizations.
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The Universalization of Civil Society as a Grassroots Actor
Interpretations of civil society have gone through transformations as the role of
the state has developed over time. What was once classically believed to be civil society
in the west has changed significantly in a time when state power is evidently growing
weaker, rolling back the state in favor of a long suffocated civil society. The term gained
its popularity in large part to the growing struggles for political and social space between
people and their government, mostly constituting of military dictatorships. Civil society
is now something to be supported, to build capacity for, just as “development” has a
staple role in “still developing” societies. What was once described as everything outside
of the government and political realm is now often times being defined to describe
specific sectors of the state, specifically non-governmental organizations (NGOs), trade
unions, and grassroots organizations. Civil Society International produces their own
definition, saying “Perhaps the simplest way to see civil society is as a "third sector,"
distinct from government and business. In this view, civil society refers essentially to the
so-called "intermediary institutions" such as professional associations, religious groups,
and labor unions, citizen advocacy organizations that give voice to various sectors of
society and enrich public participation in democracies.” Civil society is contemporarily
seen as the path to democracy, a sector of society that is necessary to develop, as it is a
democratic arena for social groups and organizations outside of the state to alter,
improve, criticize, and take action for ideologies that do or do not represent society. This
newer relationship between state and civil society is commonly referred to as the “statesociety paradigm.”
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The late twentieth century, along with the new century, ushered in a new class of
political scientists and anthropologists alike that have taken a new direction in defining
the civil society sector. The term has been uniquely modified as a major step for
emerging democracies, as naturally democratic sector of society, as “the local”, and as
the home for voluntary civil society organizations that work on “the ground” to defend
social justice issues and to claim space from political society. This notion rivals the
earlier “nation-building” theory that understood the “state”, or national level of
government, as a “new, dynamic, progressive national level energizing and overcoming
an old, stagnant, reactionary local level, the new view reverses these values” (Ferguson,
2007: 96). The universalization of civil society as grassroots actors most certainly
spawned from the political liberalization of Latin America and Eastern Europe as their
societies struggled but successfully challenged communist hegemony. Not coincidentally,
the state-society model was championed by Western democracies, including former U.S.
President Reagan and former British Prime Minister Thatcher, perhaps planting the seeds
for a post-socialist rhetoric and paving the way for the future democratization of the
“developing world”. Civil society has become so intertwined with “democracy”,
supporting the local, and grassroots organizations that discrediting it would seem like
discrediting a pacifist’s or environmentalist’s intentions. This why civil society today is
relevant in policy making, in scholarly literature, and in the media, because just as state’s
want to be democratic, there is high demand for growing and empowering civil society.
Furthermore, civil society is intimately intertwined with the development field, only
strengthening its inorganic ties to the nation-state’s path to democracy. The resurgence
of civil society, both theoretically and in policy, is made evident by the relationship of
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foreign, and specifically, Western development agencies that have utilized civil society
globally as a means to influence hegemony and avoid the lack of cooperation coming
from national governments.
James Ferguson responds to the definition and use of the term “civil society”,
without getting deeply into the genealogy of the phrase, and references Scottish
Enlightenment theorists Francis Hutcheson, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith, as well as
other European thinkers Hegel, Marx and Gramsci, to arrive to the basic concept that
civil society is most commonly used in “discussions of democracy, especially to refer to
voluntary organizations and NGOs that seek to influence, or claim space from, the state”
(Ferguson, 2007: 90). This understanding of civil society has made way for the fact that
“civil society” has become a universalized concept, filling the void for other state
challengers (communism) and best describing the post-cold war period of state
dominance versus the group assembled as “everyone else”. The state’s power,
particularly in African politics, is well represented by economically active military
forces, dictatorial ruling parties, security-police forces, over-sized bureaucracies, weak
state institutions, and a national ideology that leaves the rest of the nation for “the
opposition” or “civil society”. Ferguson writes, “Indeed, it has become one of those
things (like development, education, or the environment) that no reasonable person can
be against” (pg.91). This is a profound statement because the activity of civil society is
championed by both the state and the opposition, right or left, and both sides nurture
different and opposed ideologies for civil society’s role within the state- though both
recognizing it’s importance. Questionable? Perhaps this is why the genealogy of the term
is vital. While the universalized use of civil society implies democratic principles of
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equality, whether true or not, the study of civil society within the African context, as
Ferguson puts it, “obscures more than it reveals” and in several case can be a force that
legitimizes undemocratic principles of African politics and the state (Ferguson, 2007:
91). Still, the resurgence of civil society in Africa is mostly tied to the process of
democratization and these cases have emphasized a larger role for civil society and less a
role for the state, for better or worse.
When imagining what the state looks like in this state-society paradigm, writers
Mahmood Mamdani and Jurgen Habermas create a visualization of state-civil society
relations as being vertical and hierarchal. Mamdani explains that civil society is
“sandwiched between the patriarchal family and the universal state” (Mamdani, 1996).
Similarly, Habermas describes civil society as being the “public sphere” that mediates
between the state and the local. This imagery allows one to believe, or interpret, the state
as being a “higher power” while civil society is on the ground or local. This vertical
relationship is heavily scrutinized by James Ferguson, and rightfully so, as he too
questions not only the vertical hierarchy of state-society relations but also the misleading
manner in which the state is seen as “above”, “up top”, and “too-far to reach”. The
vertical alignment claim is to the advantage of state power or political society, as
Ferguson asserts, “these claims naturalize the authority of the state over “the local” by
merging three analytically distinct ideas-superior spatial scope; supremacy in a hierarchy
of power; and superior generality of interest, knowledge, and moral purpose- into a single
figure, the “up there” state that encompasses the local and exists on a “higher level””
(Ferguson, 2007: 92).
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Additionally, Gramsci points to how dominant social groups can pin the subaltern
groups against one another in order to fulfill that one group’s hegemonic dominance. In
Egypt the state repeatedly creates divisions between the varying groups of society,
leaving little room for cooperation, unity, and cohesiveness among civil society. Longterm development is difficult and unappreciated due to limited funds, government
support, and lack of networking; this makes way for those with the finances to determine
major courses of development. Furthermore, the state has infiltrated institutions,
organizations, and NGOs in order to maintain rhetoric and ideological dominance.
Civil society, as many have come to know it and how I’ve always been taught, is
a dynamic sphere of grassroots and dynamic local organizations that have the interests of
the population at heart. These organizations suffered at the hands of the state and need
more space and financial support for them to be successful in their development goals.
However what is left out of the assumption, as Jane Guyer claimed, “the obvious: that
civil society is largely made up of international organizations (Guyer 1994:223, Ferguson
pg. 101).” This statement cannot be made any clearer and rivals civil society perceptions
published by the UN and other organizations.
In a CIVICUS civil society index report (Civicus, 2010: 5) on Egypt highlights
civil society as being, up until recently, a fuzzy grey area where civil society mostly
described the registered civic associations under the Ministry of Social Affairs. Since this
definition does not quite fulfill the entirety of civil society, especially considering the
number of informal organizations not tied down to the government or “Gongos” who are
inherently tied to the government, civil society in Egypt is not easily defined. Similarly,
The UN 2008 Egypt Human Development Report determined that civil society in Egypt
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is “a social space occupied by citizens in which they organize themselves voluntarily to
promote common values and objectives… and is an arena of voluntary collective actions
around shared interests, purposes and values distinct from family, state, and profitseeking institutions. It is a particular space in a society where people come together to
debate, associate and seek to influence broader society.” Both reports develop a
borderline confusing; broad, non-specific, definition of civil society, with the Civicus
report even stating that civil society is not easily defined. That is because, Egyptian civil
society is not inherently “Egyptian” as we are meant to believe and his heavily affected,
funded, scrutinized, and directed by external entities of the neoliberal development
industry. While many of these organizations may have positive intentions for the ‘local’
or civil society, the influence of transnational organizations and global civil society on
national civil society must be questioned further, perhaps altering the preconceived
notion that civil society is “local or grassroots”, is in the best interest of the local
population, or that civil society works outside of political society. Similarly, the phrase
“Gongo” or “governmental non-governmental organizations” comes to mind when
considering Egyptian civil society, and while they are an essential part of the
transnational circuit, their relevance as ‘grass root’ is questionable. Civil society in the
“state-society” paradigm are supposed to have a vested interest in limiting the state’s
reach and dominance, instead, it is infiltrated by organizations that are government
influenced or controlled- expanding the reach and power of the state- creating what may
be the biggest oxymoron of twenty first century politics.

The Two Paradigms of the State (James Ferguson, pg.98)
State and Society
National
Nation-Building

46

Local

National integration:

The State:

Modernity:
Democracy:
Development:
Progress:

Modernity:
Democracy:
Development:
Progress:

+
+
+
+

Tribal, Primordial
attachments:
Modernity:
Democracy:
Development:
Progress:

-

Civil Society:
-

Modernity:
Democracy:
Development:
Progress:

+
+
+
+

Civil Society in the Egyptian Context: A Critique
Today, when analyzing the Egyptian revolution and other popular social
movements against state leadership of the Arab world, it becomes ever more urgent to
understand the current role of civil society along with the importance of understanding
what kind of practices it is involved in. James Ferguson’s analysis states that civil society
must be reinterpreted, re-imagined, and re-understood, before making claims of an
undefined, broad civil society, in order to correctly capture what civil society is in
actuality and therefore correctly capturing the role of civil society in post-revolution
Egypt. This section will discuss the problems with today’s understanding of civil society
as a grassroots actor and why the re-conceptualization of civil society is vital.
Ferguson’s vivid description of the vertical topography of power brings to mind
images of the mighty Egyptian state, the Pharaoh, the Father, the nurturer, the scientist,
the businessman, the protector of his people, and the one who knows best for a successful
society. Is civil society really the space where the father and his leadership, “the state”,
meet his children, “society”, and shows face to the community? This mental image may
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serve well as the state’s interpretation of their role among civil society. Rather than
perpetuating the belief that civil society is “the local” while the state lays “above us all”,
Ferguson recommends a “horizontal topography of power” that claims there are these
new political entities, that can often equal the strengths and capabilities of African nationstates. The IMF, WB, UN, and hundreds of transnational organizations ‘developing’ the
‘undeveloped’ represents a “new apparatus [that] does not replace the older system of
nation-states, but overlays it and coexists with it…the new organizations that have sprung
up in recent years not as challengers pressing up against the state from below but as
horizontal contemporaries of the organs of the state—sometimes rivals, sometimes
servants, sometimes watchdogs, sometimes parasites, but in every case operating on the
same level and in the same global space” (Ferguson, 2007:103). If domination of the state
is rooted to state power, as political society, then according to the state and society
paradigm, rolling back the power of the state would lead to more freedom of civil society
and ultimately more “democracy”. Ferguson, referencing the recent African colonial
period, knows that non-state actors have also dominated the state, more specifically by
private corporations, as some even hold a private army and can often dictate to the state.
One must come to realize that using today’s understanding of civil society, especially in
policy for the “developing world”, can be dangerous for society’s well being. Western
Policy and foreign aid promotes civil society in the developing world in the hope of
empowering “the bottom” of society or the mass population of these nations. Instead,
promoting and empowering civil society has resulted in the convenient funding of
transnational and government influenced organizations that work within and for the
system, perpetuating the current dynamics of power.
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A first step made in altering the conceptualization of civil society is to recognize
that a top-down, vertical approach of the state does not correctly portray the state’s
relation to civil society. The altering of this concept will simultaneously challenge
scholarly approaches to civil society-state relations as well as unintentionally challenging
the ruling power’s own awareness of supposedly residing on the top of the ‘food chain’
or above the rest of society. The government and military of Egypt, Egyptian political
society, does believe that they are in fact untouchable and above the rest of society,
however, Egyptian political society does not have the institutional capacity to bring about
economic, social, and political change—which is why altering the vertical top-down
approach may actually assist in lessening expectations of government, although this is an
unlikely reaction from the state.
Civil society must be conceptualized, not as a simple grass root actor, but as it
really is, an elaborate network of transnational and local organizations that are led and
often funded by governmental and intergovernmental organizations of the world. The
term is referenced broadly just as often as it is referenced specifically, highlighting
society as a whole but sometimes categorizing civil society organizations (CSOs) as
strictly grass root or voluntary. Ferguson asks an important question, “one is never sure:
Is the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa part of this “civil society”? John
Garang’s army in Sudan? Oxfam? What about ethnic movements that are not opposed to
or prior to modern states, but produced by them? What about Christian mission
organizations, which are arguably more important today in Africa than ever but are
strangely relegated to the colonial past in the imagination of much contemporary
scholarship (Ferguson, 2007: 98-99)?” Is civil society simply broken down into
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categories and what constitutes as a CSO? Where is the line drawn between state and
civil society, and who is who? Arguably all of these organizations play a role within the
state, but cannot be cleanly labeled or identified as the traditional “civil society actor”
that works for the interests of society over the state.
Without drawing deeply into my research, the role of supposed “civil society
organizations” within the state is so badly characterized and understood that it is
reasonable to question the motives, the alliances, and the agendas of what civil society is
in Egypt, and as Ferguson described earlier, the term civil society “obscures more than it
reveals.” In some cases, the state begins to look like civil society, with registered
Governmental Non-Governmental organizations (GONGOS) doing the development
work. With the euphoria of the recent uprising and revolution that ousted Hosni Mubarak
lessoning by the day, the transnational development apparatus has made a point to be
more actively involved in Egypt’s growth- similar to the Mubarak regime. Since
President Morsi has been elected, he has looked for IMF loans, continues to rely on US
funding, and increased Saudi Arabian and Islamic funding, while at the same time
appealing to the social movement and liberal base of organizations that want to support
“the revolutionaries”. The state has reaped the benefits of this social movement, sadly,
falling into the same debt trap as his predecessor.
Furthermore, the reconceptualization of civil society is necessary to determine
whether Egyptian civil society is legitimate in working for the best interests of the
country or whether it is in fact a variation of coercive organizations with interests outside
the Egyptian people at the epicenter of their beliefs. Egyptian civil society must be
separated from global civil society, and local organizations must be differentiated
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between transnational organizations, and vice versa. It is clear that funding civil society is
necessary, however where does the money come from? What is the agenda and program
of donor organizations, especially government donors? There are many local grassroots
organizations that are not capable in carrying out their goals without the assistance or
support of transnational organizations with shared interests, however, can local
communities and organizations receive funding for their work in civil society without the
funding being either, tied to the local government’s agenda, or to the imperialist agendas
of foreign governments? There are examples of this happening though resulting in a
harsh clamp down (accompanied by office raids) by the government.
While funding civil society carries a great level of importance, it is also worth
noting that transnational organizations can have positive effects on a local civil society.
Transnational connections have allowed local communities to creatively challenge the
state in ways that the national government is unaware of. Grassroots organizations are
well established and can use funding for creating even more space for civil society, easily
surprising the state. However, there is now a network of transnational organizations that
are connected to the global as much as the local, and will have their largest effect on
global public opinion- allowing these organizations to apply “watchdog” like pressure on
the not so local actions of the state. Local organizations can now easily link their cause
for the cause of transnational organizations, increasing global appeal, interest, and in
general the kind of global activity that the state would like to stay away from- particularly
when actively violating human rights.

Civil Society in a ‘Strong versus Weak’ State
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This literature review brings to focus the distinct and differing nature of the ‘state’
and civil society’s role within it. What needs to be discussed are the dynamics of the
‘developing’ state and how civil society does indeed serve a differing function than how
it is understood in the ‘developed’ world.
In Nazih Ayubi’s article “Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the
Middle East” the main argument is that although most Arab states, especially Egypt, are
‘hard’, ‘fierce’ states, and they are not really ‘strong’ states. Meaning, yes, they have
large, overbearing bureaucracies, large armies, and a harsh prison system, but they also
happen to be “lamentably feeble when it comes to collecting taxes, winning wars or
forging a really ‘hegemonic’ power block or an ideology that can carry the state beyond
the coercive and ‘corporative’ level and into the moral and intellectual sphere” (Ayubi,
1995). The state is not ‘strong’ because the majority of people does not benefit enough or
buy into the current power structure that the Arab state is ruled by, which is arguably a
reason why the revolution beginning in 2011 was able to occur.
Halim Barakat eloquently described in his piece “The Arab World: Society,
Culture, and State”, that the Arab state can be quite fragmented between civil and
political society. Barakat explains that culturally and socially, there is one broad, overarching society, “Arab”, and it is a social culture independent of the state. In other words,
he describes, “Arab society is not a mere mosaic of sects, ethnic groups, tribes, local
communities, and regional entities. Rather, it carries within it the potential for both unity
and divisiveness…unity versus fragmentation, tradition versus modernity, sacred versus
secular, East versus West, local versus national” (Barakat, 1993). This is what Egyptian
civil society is dealing with, as Gramsci described, a fight for cultural hegemony. The
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current President, Morsi, represents not only Egypt, but also a group (the Muslim
Brotherhood) that is challenging Western ideologies in order to achieve the social and
cultural hegemony that will allow the civil and the political to share political, economic,
and social ethics.
This understanding of Egypt as a state, and the way in which it functions, will be
the “Egypt” I will refer to throughout this thesis. Egypt became an official state in 1952
but has had the tendencies of a unified state like structure for millennium. Additionally,
colonialism, led by the British and French, was another important factor for the creation
of a developed state apparatus, military, and nationalist movements. Gramsci’s “state of
the east” is one of state hegemonic domination and a heavily regulated civil society.
Similarly, Egypt is dominated by the state; it has a highly regulated, un-united, and
malleable civil society- of course unable to truly challenge the state, and in some cases
working for its own interests, the interests of the political status-quo, or external forces.
State institutions do not provide the necessary assistance to individuals and social groups,
instead generally working for the interests of the ruling party. The state owns many high
earning industries in order to finance their domination, provides subsidies for a majority
of social groups creating dependence, and monitors social and political development to
the point that civil society has limited space to effectively challenge or counter-act the
state’s faults. Social groups are forced to “wheel and deal”, or bargain, with the state in
order find itself in their favor while avoiding marginalization. To be seen in the state’s
favor has the same effect as being formalized or supported. Jang’s ‘State Typology’ table
is useful for determining Egypt’s functions as a state. For example, corporatist states are
seen as having a weak degree of legitimacy and institutional quality, the reason why it is
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a corporatist state. Furthermore, the table also shows that the nature of exercising power
for corporatist states is through “hard power”. This “hard” power, as asserted by
Machiavelli’s The Prince and Hobbes’s Leviathan, points to the importance of control
over resources, military, and financial entities as a necessity for control and domination
over society. The use of such resources enables the ruling party to control the behavior of
societal actors. Utilizing literature on the conceptualization of the state and it’s function,
Egypt will be determined as a Gramscian state of the east, with a gelatinous civil society
given little room to develop, organize, or encompass cultural hegemony, and Ayubi’s
corporatist, “hard yet weak” state, which exercises “hard” power but is stricken with a
degree of weakness for legitimacy and institutional quality. However, I want to make
clear, that the Egypt is not so simply divided between political and civil society
institutions. The lines are blurry, many civil society institutions, including religious
leadership, for example Al-Azhar, media outlets, and non-governmental organizations are
controlled by the state and therefore work against civil society and in favor of state
dominance.
Today, the state is often dictated to by another dominate force: transnational
organizations, including but not limited to the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, other allied
and affiliated banks, and especially government development agencies. This appears to
be a form of transnational dominance or “internationalized imperialism” (Frederick
Cooper). These organizations, together, promote development practices in the form of
structural adjustment programs in order to ‘develop’ the state that is unable to finance the
programs themselves- severely imposing on sovereignty. These developmental practices
are almost entirely matched with provisions, expectations, and rules that must be upheld
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by the recipient government. While these guidelines promote the ideals and values of the
universal declaration of human rights and neoliberal macroeconomic policy, and what is
often championed as central to any transnational loan program, the devil is most certainly
in the details. These policies require “broad macroeconomic interventions as setting
currency-exchange rates, but also fairly detailed requirements for curtailing social
spending, restructuring state bureaucracies, and so on. In other words, rather significant
and specific aspects of state policy, for many African countries, are being directly
formulated in places like New York and Washington D.C” (Cooper, 2005:100).
In the case of Care International, they are welcomed by the Egyptian government
and even carry on their work through presidential decree, allowing them to avoid any of
the basic restrictions found with transnational organizations. In this case, Care Egypt,
which is a recipient of USAID money, is relied on to perform the state’s functions by
providing schools to more rural communities that see little state intervention. As a result,
these schools are not seen as locally created, they are not perceived as a government
operation, but they are recognized as “CARE schools” by the local population. Is CARE,
who carries out this state function, a prototypical organization of civil society?
Transnational organizations, like CARE, are not well defined and awkwardly play a dual
role of both the local and global. Organizations like these, where do they stand in the
vertical topography of power? An organization like I have mentioned is certainly not
below the state, if they have been performing functions of the state for many decades and
is now seen as a staple development provider, where do they stand between the
government and the people, or “top” and “bottom”?
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Civil society, according to the Egyptian state, is a collection of organizations that
are officially legitimized and regulated by the government. Grassroots organizations on
the other hand are not considered to be civil society, rather, the government contends that
these unofficial, informal groups are a threat to national security and intend on
destabilizing the nation.
These analytical alterations will ultimately allow my research and overall thesis to
correctly label civil society for what it is, and what it is not. Using the varying literature
on civil society, it is important to understand the transformation of the term over time.
Referencing classical definitions along with the more contemporary universalization of
civil society, as a grassroots actor will set the table for my thesis which questions what
Egyptian civil society actually is in practice. My research should allow growth for
understanding what civil society looks like in an African country, and may help scholars
distinguish between how they define civil society in the future. Additionally, it should
also assist in the critique towards transnational organizations and global civil society. My
research intends on giving credit to those that deserve it, those that apply pressure on
government and do not perpetuate their dominance, those that were involved in the
revolution, and namely informal individuals and groups that are hidden under the
shadows of large, corporate, CSOs. Furthermore, in fostering a better understanding of
CSO’s in Egypt, this thesis should be able to make some prescriptions, advice, and
speculate on the future direction of civil society- leading to what the future holds for a
post-revolution Egypt.

Methodology
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Primary, qualitative research was conducted throughout Cairo, Egypt to explore
the dynamics in which the Egyptian state and civil society are made up of multiple forces
formally and informally, including the “street”, local and international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), a robust USAID program and newly formed political parties
following the ousting of former president Hosni Mubarak. Due to the nature of this
diversity, there were particular challenges, setbacks and experiences that have provided
valuable insight. Individuals involved in interviews were potentially at risk based on the
politically charged content of questioning, particularly when representing “informal”
constituencies, a non-governmental organization or institutions outside of government.
With honest questioning came open criticism that then resulted in a potential risk for the
interviewees and myself. Understanding these potential risks are crucial not only in a
time where the political condition of the state is fragile and sensitive but also regarding
the validity of the research collected.
The methodology will provide an outline on the description of sample subjects,
access to subjects, the recruitment procedure, the subject consent process, as well as the
potential risks and benefits to research subjects. The Egyptian state and civil society are
made up of multiple forces formally and informally, including the activists of the
“street”, local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), USAID,
development contractors, religious institutions and newly formed political parties
following the ousting of former president Hosni Mubarak. What should be stated is that
when I describe individuals as being “educated” I am insinuating their ability to speak
multiple languages. This is relevant in regards to the interview process that will occur in
both Arabic and English. I will provide a short description of the subjects per sample.
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Members of these social forces will be interviewed, along with the use of informative
news media sources, in order to determine what civil society is in Egypt and what their
role will be in the future image of what Egypt will look like post-revolution.

Sample Description
This research’s subject sample includes various actors from the state as well as
formal and informal civil society. The single interview with a state actor was with a
member of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) although this interview will have a minimal
role in the analytical process. Additionally, the MB plays an active role in civil society
and cannot be solely seen as a state actor. The remainder of social forces within the state
and the remainder of the subjects for this research include members of, what is perceived
to be more or less, civil society. These subjects include, local and international NGO
workers, one USAID official, development contractors, activists from the left leaning
“street” and informal organizations known as initiatives, as well as members of the
Mosque and the Coptic Christian church. Similar to the MB interview, interviews with
religious institutions (namely the Mosque and the Coptic Church) were limited and have
a minimal role in the analysis. For the remainder of this section, each social group/ force
in society will be described more in depth. The subjects that are primarily utilized
throughout the analytical process are local NGOs, International NGOs, foreign
government development agencies that includes USAID and development contractors, as
well as a group of grassroots and informal activists. The table below provides more detail
of the types of organizations
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Local NGOs

Foreign
Government
Sponsored
Development
Agencies

International NGOs

Masr Al Kheir

CARE Egypt

Education for
Employment

Relief Egypt
Plan Egypt

USAID: Democracy
and Governance
official
Three
Development
Contractors

Activists/ Informal
Orgs.

Three Activists
Two members of
Initiatives
(informal
organizations

Two local NGOs were chosen, varying from development agencies to human
rights organizations, and based on the organizations willingness to interview. One or two
professionals of those organizations were interviewed from each local organization. The
NGOs that I was able to interview members from are Masr Al Kheir and the Education
for Employment foundation in Egypt. These individuals are mostly formally educated,
have relevant status within the organization, and will be early to middle aged Egyptian
Men and Women. Fortunately this will allow for interviews to be conducted in both
English and Arabic, as English is an official language of Egypt. All official languages are
taught to some degree in public and certainly private schools, which is why a large
portion of the educated population is familiar with French and English. As an Egyptian/
American, this will inevitably allow for the interview process to be simpler as far as
communication is concerned. The primary concern, or risk, for these subjects are that
these local NGO workers are members of the vast population of marginalized, naturally
as they are regulated by government.
International NGOs were chosen in varying sectors similar to the local NGOs, and
include three organizations. These organizations are CARE Egypt, Plan Egypt, and Relief
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Egypt. One to two individuals were interviewed from each organization. These
individuals were Men and Women, formally educated, twenty-five years to middle-aged
individuals who have had little to fear of the state until the recent upheaval. While there
are several local Egyptians that are employed by INGOs, a common occurrence is that
foreigners, particularly Westerners, receive better services, salary, and rights as staff
members. These members of society are highly protected by the state, as in the case of
CARE they are protected by presidential decree, and interviews with them should warrant
minimal risk. Although the military may not like what these subjects may say, foreigners
are not fully subjected to Egyptian law and are therefore also under the protection of their
state of origin.
In regards to USAID, it was my desire to interview at least two official current or
retired USAID development workers in Egypt. However, I was restricted to one interview
with a pivotal staff member of the controversial ‘Democracy and Governance’ sector of
USAID. These officials have little to zero fear of the state; however, their reluctance to
interview may be based on protocol of some kind. There are also many retired USAID
officials who are now involved in other areas of the NGO sector in Egypt that I would
like to interview if given permission to do so. I attempted to conduct interviews with
members of the U.S. state department though this was a difficult process and resulted in
zero interviewees.
Development contractors work under similar circumstances as USAID staff
members and are mostly made up of foreigners. I interviewed three development
contractors that have worked for the development industry in Egypt for up to twenty
years. They are protected both by their state of origin as well as the Egyptian government
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because they work in tandem with the Egyptian state for development. Contractors work
almost solely on USAID, WB, and IMF projects and therefore they coordinate closely
with governmental institutions to implement structural adjustment policies.
The ‘street’ portion of civil society includes my interviews with three activists
that have vowed to preserve the purpose of the revolution and continue challenging the
state. Furthermore, I interviewed two young women activists involved with various
‘informal’ organizations that work to apply pressure on the state. This arguably included
the most sensitive interviews and had to be handled with delicacy and care for their
safeties and my own. The members of the youth coalition range from the ages of eighteen
to thirty years old but will need the most care and sensitivity when interviewing. They
sound older than “youth” but in reality they are still dependent individuals. They have
lost friends throughout the duration of the revolution and have seen some difficult days
from the security forces and members of the population. While most are formally
educated, they are the most “informally” educated having lived their entire lives in a
police state and under Mubarak’s authoritative rule. Several of the interview subjects
asked to be anonymous following our meeting and therefore even the first names are
rarely mentioned.

Access to Subjects
As an Egyptian/ American, born and raised in Cairo, I am fortunate enough to still
have a majority of family still residing in Egypt. My personal connection to the
community, along with my soon to be finalized Egyptian citizenship, the research
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process, particularly how I obtained access to subjects, is sensitive for both local subjects
and myself. To obtain these interviews I accessed a number of formal, informal, and
previously connected networks. I formally contacted USAID and local/international
NGOs in order to receive consent of these interviews. While there was some success
from the formal route, there were available close ties to these individuals that I was able
to contact. Additionally, I obtained many interviews using the snowball effect. Several
interviewees were interested in the research enough to introduce me to various
individuals involved with CSOs. Personal acquaintances were made available as an
urban youth in Cairo, from my parents as educators, from family members affiliated with
NGOs and political parties, and my own connection of attending a high profile, private,
international school that has allowed access to varying individuals from the relevant
social groups. This school is where the children of USAID development workers, U.S.
department of state officials, diplomats, ambassadors, and high-ranking government and
military officials attend school. This fortunately has been a resourceful advantage for
receiving the attention of these organizations, particularly because few of them are
already established connections. Personal connections made it possible to meet with two
organization officials and one of the local subjects. Otherwise, formal networks were
made without previous association, while informal networks were made possible with the
help of reliable informants through who I am personally connected. These informants are
more than often a part of the organization and/or community of the subjects I intend to
interview. As for the youth movement coalition, I have credible informants that provided
individuals capable of performing interviews. Literally phone calls will be made to
trusted informants to allow my presence among the youth members. Many individuals
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had an interest to interview, as a tool for relaying their broader message, though I chose
three key individuals. These activists have spent the majority of the past year in Tahrir
square, the geographical symbol of the ‘street’ civil society and the location of where
these relationships were established.

Recruitment Procedure
Participation of the subjects for interviews were obtained through the application
of face-to-face requests, emails, phone calls, and snowball sampling. Original contacts
required either one-phone call with informants and organizations or by email; however,
in certain instances I formally approached organizations face-to-face to discuss the
purpose of my study rather than carrying it out on the phone or by email. Particularly
with the local population, people respond to face-to-face contact to properly assess the
interaction in order to better judge my intentions as the interviewer. Still, the snowball
sampling proved to be the most common form of recruiting interviewees. Snowball
sampling provided a more comfortable setting with several individuals because of the
vital application of trust between interviewees and myself.
In the case that face-to-face contacts were not successful in obtaining
interviewees, than these contacts would no longer be considered. Two forms of contact
on a subject will be the limit because there are many available subjects within an
organization that may be available. Similarly, organizations that passed on providing
consent for interviews would not be contacted multiple times. There were several
international and local NGOs to choose from that run on similar agendas, share similar
purposes of function, and receive similar amounts of ridicule and regulation from the
government. Within the Coptic Orthodox church and Mosque there are many spiritual
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leaders, sheikhs/priests, who would have been open to a conversational discussion on
what the future holds for Egyptian society. During the interview with a member of the
MB, my informant Mahmoud (an aspiring journalist) provided the access and was vital to
obtaining this interview with a generally closed society. All in all, many individuals from
all social groups were willing to divulge in their own version of the state of Egyptian civil
society. You see it on late night news stations, where there is an influx of heated social,
economic, and political discussion between individuals on television or those who call in
to join the conversation. It is clear that the majority of the population feels that they have
a stake in the future process. This is why the recruitment procedure was not as difficult as
expected. What was difficult: determining and clarifying the voices, individual opinions,
and stances of the subjects within each social group interviewed.
As far as receiving the necessary consent for the interview process, a form of
written consent or vocal consent was provided for every possible subject. I also vocally
presented the consent process in order to validate the subjects understanding of their
individual rights within the interview. The forms were provided in both English and
Arabic according to the subject’s ethnicity, although there was subjects who only
received the consent form in either only English or Arabic, based on their linguistic
background. In a few cases where informed consent from a subject was difficult to
obtain, I replaced it with vocal consent. This was necessary due to the security situation,
the perceived alienation of the subject for having to sign a document, as well as the social
situation, for example if I were in front of multiple peers in the vicinity and had
individuals sign a paper it will not be welcomed. If vocal consent was not provided then
they were not able to participate. I made this fact known by simply explaining to them
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my background as an Egyptian student who is performing research on the functions of the
state along with the work of civil society. If they had little interest in participating or they
were skeptical of the study, which was understandable, they were notified that the
process was entirely voluntary. In the case that individuals were uncomfortable with
specific questions, they were allowed to avoid questions and leave them unanswered at
their request.

Interview Procedure
Subjects took part in a conversational experience with the aim of creating a
comfortable environment. There was zero exposure to film, music, surveys, no
experimental interventions or manipulations of any kind. Consent for voice recording
interviews was made clear in person and entirely voluntary. Interviews were based
around functions of employment, what the organization provides to the state, what their
relationship with the government is like, the effects of government influence, their
relationship with the people they serve, etc. these questions could be passed over in order
to avoid putting the subject into an uncomfortable position. If there are conflicts of
interest they were not a part of the questioning from the beginning. Local NGO workers
appeared conscience of there choice of diction, however I made it clear that as long as
anonymity is kept, their organization will not be put at risk based on their opinions of the
government. Egyptians were not put at risk simply through my interviewing process.
What would put subjects at risk is if there was reckless planning of the interview setting.
This would only feel “risky” for individuals from the Youth movement, which is why
they interviewed in low-key venues such as a cafe. Small, less public, privately owned
cafés were a common setting for discussion and the interview process. The most vital
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aspect of the interview process is that subjects were aware of why I am conducting this
research. This is vital because, firstly, interviewees wanted to know my intentionsparticularly during a difficult, transitional, volatile time in Egypt’s history, and especially
if it will include controversially charged discussions. The intention was to make all
subjects aware that they, and their affiliations, have a communal stake in creating a
stronger nation post-Mubarak. The interview process allowed members of various groups
the opportunity to express their own beliefs, reservations and hopes, their own
organization’s relationships with other social groups, as well as the intentions of powerful
forces within the state and civil society. By obtaining this research and the subject’s
responses, future anthropologists, and anthropologists alike, will find it easier to
distinguish the future trajectory of Egypt as an organized state, as a community of civil
society, and governing entity.

Potential Risks and Benefits to Subjects
Potential risks to subjects are based around political interests and whether they are
correctly representing the organization the subject represents. For international NGOs
and USAID, there is a minimum to the risk they are subject to. Their highest risks are
centered on discomfort through the asking of politically charged questions. Though they
can voluntarily skip a question, loss of confidentiality can also be at risk for these
subjects in case they are replying to a question independently of their organization’s
beliefs. Local NGOs and members of the youth coalition are subject to the most potential
risk during this research. As native Egyptians, they are at risk of offending the
government, discomfort of interview could lead to a feeling of losing confidentiality,
furthermore, even the educated Egyptian class are subjected to some form of social or
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political marginalization. Questioning local NGOs on their opinions of governmental
intervention and the USAID program would certainly help to create a charged
conversation if not handled correctly. My questioning was worded sensitively and in
ways that would be straightforward so that no misunderstandings or speculations were
made based on heavily charged diction. Local organizations also have governmental
influences lending to more reason why the questioning process had to be worked out
thoroughly. It was important not to have assumptions within the questioning process. My
questions inquired about relationships with other social forces, and the subject chose to
elaborate on that accordingly. Also, much of the local urban population, in particular
“active” individuals, did not seem to be scared, ashamed or discomforted by speaking
openly about the government-within reason. This is a brand new development, since the
revolution, that had the potential of changing on a case-by-case basis. Other individuals
that could have been subjected to potential risks were my informants, many of whom I
am personally connected. These informants, family friends, colleagues, and friends
assisted with collecting some of the subject interviewees among the several parties that
were interviewed. Though they were not as involved in any part of the interviewing
process, it is vital that their anonymity is kept unless noted otherwise.
In general, I hope that all subjects benefited from the interview process.
Relationships were successfully built throughout the interview process, which is why the
procedure is that critical. Every interview strived for a comfortable, casual, and honest
atmosphere between the interviewee and myself. The subject from USAID did not overly
benefit from the interview because of a strong ideological system that they have in place.
Subjects who work for international and local NGOs will benefit from the interview
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process simply as an interesting interview, one that will allow them to be reflective on
their work and the surrounding community. Youth members of the ‘street’ can potentially
benefit through the networking opportunity that will be presented. In general I want more
from them than I will be able to provide to them, however, the interview process will
benefit these individuals for the sake of reflecting on their present and future plans for
civic action. As far as actual physical costs for subjects, they are minimal. Most of the
costs will be in the form of time. I will make an effort for every interview to do the
majority of traveling in order to reach the interviewees preferred area of Cairo.

Minimization of Potential Risk
As stated previously, there were potential risks and benefits that subjects could
experience if the interviews occurred without the necessary briefing and questioning
procedure. Subjects who have the protection of organizations, particularly NGOs and
USAID, dealt with much less risk based on institutional protection. The members of these
organizations also may benefit the least from the interview process because of their class
and economic status. Subjects who have little to zero backing of organizations and are
street protest participants of the Youth coalition were the highest potential risk but still
benefit from the experience of speaking their mind and having someone listen. I believe
this is a benefit because the work of the “activists” continues to bring awareness and
advocacy to the original goals of the revolution. The risk involving these subjects were
minimized firstly, by presenting a necessary briefing of why I am asking questions while
providing necessary background information of myself in order to insure transparency.
Secondly, subjects were notified that their answers would be anonymous based on
preference and that they are voluntarily answering questions. Thirdly, I tried to stay away
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from group discussions of any kind because of peer pressure, not only to say the correct
statements but also to avoid any sort of political pressure that individuals feel from one
another. Because there is a high source of political tension, the interview process was
preferably based around one on one casual conversation so that subjects felt comfortable
to speak their opinions.

Positives, Limitations and Areas Missed
There were several limitations during the research process that I will address here.
Firstly, the limited time for research is a concern. I spent a total of three and a half
months conducting interviews and obtaining research in Egypt and I believe with more
time some limitations could have been avoided. Specifically in the case of the number of
interviews conducted, reaching out to other relevant social forces of society, and
spending more time obtaining interviews out of the country’s capital would have ensured
an increase in depth and reflexivity of this anthropological study. Secondly, I was unable
to reach any members of political society as I had originally intended. I could not
organize interviews with members of the military due to the current state of affairs. Their
voice and opinion of civil society would have been useful. Another limitation was the
language and ethnicity barrier. Though this was rarely an issue, the fact that I am an
Egyptian of mixed descent rather than full-blooded may inevitably attributed to a few
setbacks. Trust, a valuable mechanism between the interviewee and interviewer, did not
turn out to be serious issue. Although being ethnically half-American (Caucasian) in my
opinion resulted in specific interviewees feeling uneasy about carrying on a conversation
on their political discourse. Moreover, in order to ensure the one hundred percent correct
use and translation of Egyptian Arabic a friend and fluent speaker accompanied me
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during a few interviews that were conducted only in Arabic. While I interviewed
individuals in Arabic on my own, I still felt it to be important to ensure there would be no
linguistic miscues during the interview process, although I was concerned another
individual with me would add anxiety.
A few members of local NGOs also were not interested in being interviewed or
discussing civil society’s role within the state. An example of this is in my attempt to
reach out to priests from the Coptic Church. I eventually interviewed six members of the
Coptic Orthodox church however I spent the majority of my time ensuring them that
recordings and identities would not be exposed to the public, as they rightfully appeared
skeptical about presenting their political opinions to anyone let alone someone of mixed
descent. Another limitation was that I attempted to reach several members of the U.S.
State Department in Egypt and was rejected unanimously. I continue to feel curious about
why members of a foreign entity happened to be the least transparent. Lastly, this thesis
is meant to describe civil society in Egypt as a whole; however none of the conducted
interviews were located outside of Egypt’s major urban centers of Cairo and Alexandria.
While most NGOs and social forces of “formal” civil society are based out of Egypt’s
urban centers there are certainly active elements of their work in rural areas. Also,
‘informal’ civil society is extremely active in less urban regions of the nation, in
particular for the causes of the Nubian population in Upper Egypt as well as the Bedouin
population in the Sinai Peninsula.
While there were several limitations, the research process produced many positive
results. Firstly, I was introduced to wonderful people using the snowball effect. Some
interviewees were able to facilitate meetings for myself with other members of their
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organization or of another organization. Fortunately, initial interviewees were considerate
and introduced me to highly relevant and active individuals who maintained a rich,
qualitative understanding of Egyptian civil society and roles of major CSOs. The
interview process also provides excellent contacts post-research for when I am back in
the country. Finally, another positive is that although not all the interviews conducted
were utilized for this paper, all the results had an ultimate effect on the re-conceptualizing
of civil society. Besides the social forces discussed throughout the analysis I interviewed
religious institutions (members of both the Mosque and the Church), staff members from
the United Nations Development Program in Cairo, as well as a member of the MB. The
interviews were relevant and provided useful insight and future references.
Next, this section will highlight several topics that were avoided throughout this
thesis for several reasons. No reason however was for the sole purpose of ignoring
important issues; rather my research did not permit the inclusion of specific topics due to
time constraints and the limited number of interviews. Firstly, activists are not the sole
form of pure civil society though they are a primary example and source of civil society
work. Labor unions, which were not discussed in my research, have an extremely
influential role in Egyptian society, as they are active in applying pressure on the private
sector and government. There are state run and independent labor unions that are
especially vital in the recent social movements throughout Egypt. Factory workers are
utilized for mass protests and are capable of severely crippling state owned industries.
Labor unions are quite possibly the necessary force for destabilizing and applying
pressure on the government pre and post revolution. Additionally there are artists,
political cartoonists, anarchists and many small, informal but organized groups that take
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pride in challenging the state in a less direct manner. Graffiti artists for example provide
the story of the movement on public wall space throughout Cairo and on most stateowned buildings. Graffiti plays a key role in taking up public space to spread a message
to all who can see it. Even if the state washes away anti-government graffiti, there is
always someone who will repaint another message.
I failed to mention the role of religious institutions on civil society. The members
of these religious institutions provided useful information during the interviews;
however, it was clear that they tried to exclude themselves from the political realm. They
are active in society and certainly provide elements of financial, moral, and religious
support to their constituents. Mosques and Churches still encourage individuals to take
part in nation’s political process but are clearly not interested in challenging government.
Priests and Sheikhs use their influence to encourage positive change; nevertheless, these
institutions are more concerned about stability, safety, and security for their constituentsparticularly for the minority of Christians. During my sole interview with a member of
the formerly illegal Muslim Brotherhood, civil society was referenced using dual
definitions. In one way the doctor understood civil society as “activity and mobilization
on the ground” until civil society became a reference for the “civil” state that will come
to fruition under the rule of the MB. Either way, it is important to reference other
differing contexts of the use of the term civil society outside of how I have previously
described misinterpretations of the term. Lastly, I was unable to discuss the heavy
influence the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has had on ‘informal’ civil society which I
consider to be legitimate civil society. The MB, over the past decades, has developed a
strong following among lower-income constituents. Their methods include providing
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social services in the form of health and education, religious teachings, and charity. The
MB formerly associated in “the street” and successfully garnered support by large
portions of the population due to the services they provide. Since the government had
been terrible at providing services, the MB for some time received praise and support for
their civil society work. However, it is worth noting that receiving support through
services to the poor can be interpreted as a form of manipulation. This can be seen as
manipulation due to the MB’s ascendance to power following the uprising and their
ability to receive votes from the rural, low-income constituents that they served.
Furthermore this form of civil society work is similar to the concept of charity and
provides a short-term solution. Their inclusion in this research is due to their newly
created role of leading government and their now dominance of political society.

Analysis: Not what it seems
Beginning on the 25th of January 2011, something groundbreaking, some may call
earth, or state, and even socio-politically shattering happened; it was surreal. But in fact
this was the realest occurrence that happened in greater Cairo, Alexandria, and many
surrounding cities, since I cannot even recall, or at least since fast-food delivery became
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possible. An event, or a string of events, rather a movement exponentially erupted
throughout the plethora of nook and cranny streets of Egyptian cities everywhere,
resembling the pumping of a thousand blood vessels reaching the heart or meeting place.
Some say they could not have, in their wildest dreams, believed this was possible; others
simply give the facts behind why the largest movement of civic engagement and protest
against the state since Saad Zaghloul in 1919, was happening, or depending on whom you
speak with, is still happening. Just months earlier, the people of Tunisia rose up in acts of
civil disobedience in a cry for ‘a better life’ with the result of the toppling of ex-President
Ben Ali, who when given the chance, fled to Saudi Arabia with his family and his tail
between his legs. Was this what Egyptians wanted? I mean who knows what anyone
wants when a president is deified as a Pharaoh, has the backing of a ‘popular’ military
dictatorship, managed to continuously rule for thirty years, and appeared more concerned
about retaining the executive, legislative, and judicial power within his military trained
fist clench rather than do his best to… Apologies, here I am venting and rambling, but I
have a point. What exactly was it that allowed for such a fervent, socio-economically
diverse collective of individuals to organize such grand events, the main-event of our
generation, a political storm following three decades of relatively calm waves of
complacency? And more importantly, who are these people? Who are they affiliated
with? Who do they represent? Is this Egyptian civil society at it’s finest? Who is part of
civil society and who is not? And come to think about it where were the NGOs, the
CSOs, the donors offering funds, the assistance from civil society in order to counterbalance the political chaos, and the government’s work, or lack thereof?
One year later, over one thousand Egyptian deaths, even more injuries, supposed
sectarian violence, state sponsored violence, ousting of Hosni Mubarak along with his

74

National Democratic Party, and the state is still in disarray. I found myself attending the
one-year anniversary of the revolution in the epicenter of Cairo, Tahrir Square. Nearly
one million strong in the country’s capital and the revolution felt all but finished. The
scent of teargas was not available to torment civilians, the images of police and military
were non-existent; the passionate, revolutionary spirit felt fresh- as if I had never been in
the U.S. studying the year before. While some groups treated the day as a time to
celebrate, many felt that the trials and tribulations of Egyptian citizens were beginning to
seem like a lost cause, as if the revolution had not been realized. Besides the ousting of
Mubarak and members of his authoritarian regime, they were right, much had gone
unchanged.
The post-revolution era undoubtedly opened the door wide open for this project,
as my interviewees are conducted with controversial and influential members of society.
It just so happens that people want to talk now, a lot. It’s not that this wasn’t the case
before; on the contrary, Egyptians are highly social. However, the political realm has
always been a sector of society to be set aside, to not question in fear of going mad over
the illogical leadership that has ensued the past several decades. I set out to my home
country with a question in mind. This question needed to be asked, discussed, and
internalized, but by whom?
For this section, and the ultimate purpose of my research, I provide the analytical
framework for answering THE question of interest- what civil society is in Egypt. Civil
society is an inevitable keyword in the globalizing process of ‘democratization’, whether
through policy or academia. The term civil society has developed into a theoretically
integral aspect of “democracy” as well as for describing “the local”. It is often believed
that empowering civil society is equivalent to empowering ‘the local’, with the hope that
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seeds for democracy are planted. This analytical process will explore the ambiguity of
civil society, particularly in the case of Egypt, and will discuss the conceptualizing of
such a socially and politically charged term. By presenting my research findings, which I
conducted throughout Cairo and includes the voices of various dominating social forces
of the state and supposed civil society, I hope to bring to light the questions surrounding
what Egyptian civil society is, especially if it is indeed a policy tool for the
democratization process. I had the opportunity to reach several influential members of socalled civil society, asking them similar questions on what their opinions were of the
sector, whether they were apart of it, the importance of it in Egypt, while interlinking the
political context of the revolution and the newly founded government.
I will discuss and analyze the varying opinions on what Egyptian civil society
while utilizing several narratives from the interviews I conducted with what I consider to
be the major social forces of this sector. These social forces are have the most influence
on civil society and include the following groups, international NGOs (INGOs), local
NGOs, foreign governments or affiliates (Aid, Development contractors), and a group of
activists that represent, more or less, “the street”. Interviews were also conducted with
members of religious institutions as well as with a member of the MB though their
responses will be utilized differently. The second section will also discuss the affiliation
between the previous groups that I have mentioned and the Egyptian government.
Finally, the final section of my analysis will explore and discuss a re-conceptualization of
Egyptian civil society, with the help of James Ferguson, while presenting an original civil
society diagram/model.

Egyptian Civil Society’s thoughts on Egyptian Civil Society
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Here I present my findings on what CSO’s, governmental affiliates, informal
organizations and unaffiliated, independent members of ‘the street’ believe to be civil
society. This is an important finding for the overall discussion on Egyptian civil society,
as you will find that there is indeed an identity crisis that needs sorting, and whom better
to debate the topic than with influential members or affiliates of the supposed Egyptian
civil society sector. Voices from within the state are the most vital, if not knowledgeable,
however, keep in mind the traditional, theoretical definition of civil society while
analyzing the functions of civil society organizations in reality and in practice.

a. International NGO’s
What do prominent international NGOs think is civil society, and do they believe
their own organizations are a part of it? I was able to reach the staff of a few
organizations based in Cairo but that do a majority of their work in rural Egypt, namely,
CARE Egypt, Plan Egypt, and Relief International. Through an interview process, which
often took place at the organization’s headquarters, I received the opinions of several
high-ranking staff members on what they thought of Egyptian civil society, how they
were involved with it, and whether they consider themselves to be a part of it. What
seems to be a fairly simple and straightforward question has obviously opened the doors
to several deeper issues, mostly being an identity confusion crisis. Responses from this
mixed group of men and women either appear to be specific, rehearsed definitions of
what civil society is in theory, or, they provide an answer that reflects confusion in their
own belief of this sector of society.
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CARE, based in Cairo for approximately sixty-five years, emerged in Egypt back
in the early era of ‘development and cooperation’ between the west and ‘developing’
nations. The organization’s interests began due to the humanitarian crisis in Palestine,
and later evolving to the long-term, sustainable development agenda. Over the past few
decades CARE has grown to become a partnership organization that looks to play an
intermediary role for other local partners, as “typically local partners will do between
twenty five percent and seventy percent of the work, depending on their strengths and
objectives”, the country director explained. They work in four separate programs on
women’s rights, governance, agriculture and natural resources, and female education with
the primary focus being on women and youth. The man I spoke to in particular is the
office’s country director, meaning he runs the organization and is the primary resource
for the international headquarters. He was an extremely kind hearted American man who
lived in Cairo as a child and came back to work later in his life and has continued to do so
for some time. I then proceeded to ask him the big question, what does this development
professional think is Egyptian civil society?

“I really question what a lot of Egyptian NGOs, and CDOs (community
development organizations), CDA’s, I really question whether many of those
organizations are really civil society. Often they have a founding member, they’re
more a charitable organization at the local level, so they don’t really represent
anybody, they don’t do any lobbying or advocacy, they collect food for people,
they do various small projects for local communities, but often it is headed by a
single person. They are staffed by volunteers, there is nothing particularly
sustainable about it, and when the money runs out or the person loses interest, the
CDO folds. So civil society in Egypt, I would say is pretty weak. I’d say it’s
composed of professional NGOs who are self-sustaining and have resources,
through donors (private or institutional) or their own resources, to carry on
programs. Also international NGOs, lobby advocacy groups, such as women’s
rights groups, environmental groups, and children’s rights groups. It’s a very
small group in Egypt, real civil society, because my definition would be a group
that is formed on a permanent basis that represents a certain constituency, and
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works on different levels to support that constituency. Often it would be a
constituency that doesn’t have a voice somehow. It doesn’t have to be, but I think
that the idea of true civil society is to represent people, and to act as a bridge
between the government and local people in some area or some areas. And in
Egypt, that doesn’t happen very often. Some international NGOs, larger national
NGOs, and larger Local NGOs would be my narrow definition of civil society.
Concerning charity organizations, are they really civil society? To me, you don’t
want to make the definition too broad because then it just becomes nothing. The
other problem here with civil society is that the government regulates and
controls all national NGOs very tightly. So when they are actually giving money
to local NGOs, which they actually do to every NGO that is registered with the
Ministry of Social Development gets money from the ministry, so therefore it is
very questionable… if that is the money that enables them to survive, then they
cannot be civil society and instead are actually arms of the government.”
By the time he was finished answering the question we both seemed to express
confusion, he didn’t know if I wanted more out of the answer or whether he should just
keep exploring the idea. His response reflects the many problems I mentioned
previously. Firstly, that the diluting and broad usage of civil society will certainly weaken
the sector, secondly, that he questions whether organizations posing as civil society are
really civil society, thirdly, that international NGOs, or transnational organizations,
should be included as a part of Egyptian civil society, and lastly, that nearly all formal
local NGOs are regulated tightly- which includes the funds that they are able to receive
from donors, therefore essentially existing as a governmental non-governmental
organization. In response to my question of whether CARE was a part of Egyptian civil
society, he responded, “We try very hard to be part of civil society… yes we say we are.
I’m biased of course.” This point would confirm that he believes that member
international organizations of the transnational sector are at the same time a valuable
member of Egyptian civil society. Being my first interview with an international
organization, I figured responses would be rather similar, with different variations of
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course. However my initial thoughts did not hold true as I continued on to conduct the
next interview with PLAN Egypt’s country director.
Plan Egypt is an international NGO that works in seventy different countries.
Their programs, like CARE, are committed to child and women development, active
citizenship, and community organization. Speaking with the country director, Edward,
who is also an American, there were some differing opinions to that of CARE. When I
asked him to define Egyptian civil society for me, he responded by saying,

“It’s the space that’s not government, but also not business or private sector. If
you are working in a big business that’s not civil society. But they are promoting
the concept of citizenship more than civil society because citizens that are in
government might actually be Muslim Brotherhood, and if you work in a business
like Google, and afterhours you are on Tahrir square. So, whether you are
organized or not, this idea of citizenship and how rights are respected in a
country is another concept. But for us, civil society is still the most common term
for allowing people to associate, organize, around their own issues, as well as
advocate for minority based issues.”
On whether Plan Egypt is a part of Egyptian Civil society he quickly proclaimed that they
are not, instead he asserted, “Ok, as an international NGO, we support local civil society
but we are not actually part of it, because almost by definition civil society is indigenous.
We are not even too sure on how to define ourselves, but we are here to support civil
society.” He, and the mission of Plan Egypt, is to strengthen civil society, not to be a part
of it. He makes it clear that Egyptian civil society must be inherently Egyptian or
indigenous. This brings several intriguing thoughts to mind: how can these organizations
strengthen civil society, as if to say they are “above” or “outside” of the sphere and are
simply mechanics working to fix the problem? They have a local presence, hire Egyptian
nationals, and receive enough funding from their donors to carry out their work in a
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sustainable fashion, and yet they seem to believe they are outside of this realm, as if they
only provide positive assistance. By the time I completed the second interview with the
international NGO sector, I realized that I heard two different responses to what civil
society is in Egypt, and furthermore, civil society was defined again from a broad to a
specific form: “promoting citizenship to the space where people are allowed to associate
and organize.” However, this definition can be misleading because if Egyptian civil
society is a place where people are allowed to “associate, and organize around their own
issues”, then how is it that an international NGO is able to strengthen this sector? By
promoting citizenship, and building capacity of local organizations, etc. this implies that
Egyptians are incapable of organizing themselves, besides a lack of funding, this is not
necessarily the case.
Relief International, based in Cairo, is a newly established international
organization that I was able to organize an interview with. The interview consisted of
four Egyptian staff members, two men and two women, including the country director.
They were open, transparent and invited me in to their apartment style office with open
arms to meet with the vital members of their staff. All four members, throughout the
duration of the interview were opinionated, knowledgeable, experienced, and at times
disagreed over what constituted as Egyptian civil society. When I went ahead and asked
them their opinion on what civil society in Egypt was, they each provided elaborate
responses and plenty more than the previous interviews. Still, the confusion over what
appears to be a commonly used phrase and question, “what is Egyptian civil society?” is
perhaps the central catalyst for my thesis inquiries. This extremely helpful group of
Egyptian development workers provided a wide array of examples of the varying levels
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of civil society, yet, debated over what constitutes as a CSO and what CSO’s do as
Egyptian civil society immediately took over the discussion.
The country director began by saying:

“Let me start, I would say civil society are not government, not military, and not
business. That is civil society for me, it is not a government organization, business
orientated or military.”
A simple yet elegant reply was to be expected from the elder leader in the office.
Immediately after, the second man responded quickly and quietly by saying,

“It is a medium for community participation, it is sometimes organized and
sometimes not. It can be a movement, or a popular committee, or a group of
people that have a purpose for action, or an organization.”
He was then quick to add that he would “like to differentiate that charitable
organizations, mostly religious- Muslim or Christian- and sometimes secular work, there
are human rights organizations, there are syndicates, they are all doing different work
but they are all considered part of Egyptian civil society. Speaking about Egyptian civil
society I have not mentioned any INGOs. INGOs are contributing to Egyptian civil
society financially, technically, and capacity building but most probably as INGOs work
differently- empowering civil society, empowering local groups, for them to help local
groups and communities. UN is civil society, USAID is civil society, for us they are not
Egyptian government, they are not local NGOs, they are Egyptian NGOs- there are
different categories but we can consider them as catalysts.”
Eager to jump an experienced development worker, she said, “Organizations that
are not military, government, or business. However in Egypt there are heavily regulated
organizations by the government. Although they are not government, every step
everything inside is very much looked at by government so they are not as free as other
CSOs in other countries- so there is a strong government presence whether we like it or
not and most CSOs are on the side of charitable organizations, for many of them they
don’t know the difference between charity work, development work, or political work, or
rights based. So for me civil society in Egypt, there biggest problem is not that we don’t
have one, we have one of the largest presence of Civil society organizations its more of a
question of how the government controls them, what they are actually working in, and
their understanding of what they should be able to do as civil society.”
After pausing shortly she came back to add that her personal opinion was that
“USAID is not civil society, that’s pure government and it is part of the state
department so it’s purely political, it’s here for political reasons so it’s very
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subject to what it wants to do. So in my personal opinion is it’s doing things for
civil society but its jurisdiction is political. In 2006 when it became part of the
state department, it’s no longer separated from the political agenda of the
country- and that was a big change for USAID in the world.”
With little else to say afterwards, the fourth employee chose to move on to the next
question, saying she agreed with all that was said by her previous colleague. Still, their
responses continued to reflect the essential debate of who is a part of civil society. The
debate over whether USAID was a member of Egyptian civil society is clearly relevant as
they fund and sustain several international and local organizations. To say that they were
not a member of civil society would be questionable as they are providing the necessary
funds to the organizations they choose- but this is all wrong. They are a part of the U.S.
government. USAID funds are guided by the agenda of the U.S. state department and
they come from the pockets of American taxpayers. They cannot possibly be considered
Egyptian civil society even though they fund a large portion of it. One thing is clear, each
response included a broad, all encompassing definition of civil society before each
became hyper specific, even differentiating charity organizations (a vast portion of
supposed CSO’s) from the sector.
Mohsen went on and explained, “There was a study issued on the year 2000 by an
American living in Egypt, his name is Mr. Robert LaTowsky. He did a study about CSO’s
and divided them into three sectors- primary (grassroots), intermediary, and tertiary
sectors. It is a very nice study, and I recommend it.” Mr. Robert LaTowsky
compartmentalized the NGO sector in Egypt. The primary NGOs are considered
grassroots and are the organizations dealing first hand in providing services. Intermediary
NGOs, which are most INGOs, are organizations that don’t carry out services
themselves, instead they work alongside primary NGOs and provide the necessary
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financial, technical assistance. INGOs no longer are the direct provider of services to the
local people. Thirdly, tertiary NGOs are made up of advocacy groups and CSO’s that are
providing awareness of human rights and other relevant social issues. He was an
intriguing and helpful character although his work was mainly focused on the NGO
sector as a whole, leaving out many of the organizations that are informal and unregistered.
Finally, I was able to reach and interview a veteran development worker in Egypt,
an American who has spent time working for several non-profits in Egypt, Dan Coster.
With the snowball effect able produce most of my interviews; Dan was one who was
willing and able to introduce me to colleagues in different CSO’s. In the comfort of his
apartment flat I went ahead and asked him the golden question. He responded first by
saying that the:

“Organizations I’ve directly worked with in this country have been Care, Care
International, RTI (Research Triangle International), and AIR (American Institute
for Research). So all three organizations are international in nature and therefore
from what I’ve said previously, I do not consider them as civil society
organizations. But, I consider them integral to strengthening civil society in
Egypt.”
He then jumped at the opportunity to define civil society in Egypt, saying:
“Purely, civil society, I feel is ownership. Could be at a community or district,
national, levels. Civil society is ownership, its accountability, and holding the
government accountable; and ownership in its pure stage needs to be local. So
you’ve got international players and you’ve got UN players, all kinds of
stakeholders in the strength of civil society, but what is civil society? I think its
local organizations. I have been working with the community level. But to sustain
things at the community level, but to sustain at this level, obviously the
environment is linked to government. CSOs are organizations and people of
influence, organizations that are influential and local in nature, and that work
from the community to district or governorate or to the national level. Harnessing
people’s interests, their demands, exerting their influence on government so that
they can provide services.”

84

Following his response, I asked him if to be part of civil society you have to be a local?
And what line divides you from being a part of civil society or not? He retorted by
saying:

“Well I think, International entities, their mandate is things like poverty
alleviation, human dignity, bringing marginalized people up. But the way they do
that is through, their strategy, is to implement projects that are linked to their
long-term strategy. I see these entities they enter life and then they exit, in other
words they serve as a catalyst. I don’t think that if these organizations are part of
civil society that means they’re the ones that need to change things. I think they
are change organizations but what they do is they enable local populations to
change things, so that when they exit, if there’s nothing sustained upon their
leaving, and then I’d think that it’s a big waist of time. If they’re the ones who are
responsible for the long term, they are responsible to be a catalyst and enable
organizations, so that when they leave, the people can demand and hold power
and government accountable. So if you take your eye off of that ball and you say
‘no we are the civil society organizations and we make change’ rather than being
the catalyst, alright well you’ll make some change but I don’t think it will be half
as sustainable or half as long term impactful as it needs to be.”
Making a compelling argument, Dan explained the difference between catalyst
organizations that empower and help develop civil society and actual Egyptian CSOs.
While indeed a necessary differentiation, his response still emphasized the influence that
international entities have on the local population with the strategy and agenda of the
foreign donor. Again, civil society is referred to as being constructed from “abroad” or
from “outside of the state” as “catalyst” organizations, which are not CSOs but work to
empower CSOs.
What is clear from these international NGO workers is that they are not
completely sure who or what makes up Egyptian civil society. Certain interviewees were
adamant about considering their respective organizations as Egyptian civil society and
others felt their organization worked from outside to strengthen civil society. Either way
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there is divided responses among the international NGO community as these
organizations emphasize “locality”, being “indigenous”, and holding government
accountable, functions that INGOs do not necessarily commit to.

b. Local NGO
Now lets look at the opinions of a few members of local NGOs and discuss what
they had to say on civil society. The first Egyptian NGO that I was able to meet through a
family connection is Masr Al Kheir. In a particularly professional setting, I interviewed
the director of fundraising of the organization along with a sidekick of his, who either had
no title or forgot to mention it. This NGO is a large non-profit organization that works in
a wide range of development fields for the betterment of the Egyptian people. This
organization is certainly a leader in their field as they are able to receive funds locally, to
sustain themselves, and are widely visible in the media with a commercial presence.
Their message is broad and all encompassing, they want to “develop people…improve
the socio economic status of individuals and groups” as the two gentleman I met with
proclaimed. However, it is difficult to compare this NGO to other local NGOs due to the
difference in size, capacity, and funds. In many cases Masr al Kheir is one of handful
sustainable organizations of this size, but do they function in a civil society dominated by
transnational organizations and government restriction? The answer is yes. I asked both
of them what they thought of civil society in Egypt and whether they believe they are a
part of it. Needless to say I received a limited response. This is what they said:

“M1: “Anything but the government… multi-national companies, it’s like an NGO for the
welfare of society.”
M2: “I look at it the same, anyone that is concerned with the development of humanity.“
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On whether they considered themselves to be a part of civil society:
“M1 and M2: Yes, we are a leading NGO.”
They considered all of society, outside of the government, that was concerned for the
development of Egypt and humanity as a whole. Quite a wide range to choose from, what
is the indicator for “concern of humanity”. We all individually care about society to a
certain level, with exceptions of course, however how do we know CSO’s are conducting
the necessary functions of civil society and vouching for Egyptian society? Additionally,
they seemed to include the business sector into civil society, which was not uncommon to
find amongst my research, although it is questionable to me how developed the practices
of corporate social responsibility are amongst the private sector. Similarly, the private
sector provides limited funding, on a whole, to civil society. Still, I will agree that for
many organizations, funding is funding and can be the difference to whether an
organization can continue functioning or not. Ultimately, it was a limited response to the
civil society question, indicating the similar trend of this strange ambiguity of a sector
that has received millions of dollars domestically and abroad, mostly abroad, to develop
the very sector we find ourselves lost in.
The next local NGO worker I was fortunate to interview works for an
organization called Education for Employment in Egypt. Meeting with this young
woman, in her mid twenties, was indeed a refreshing change of pace from the older
generation I had been meeting with consistently for months. She gladly went right into
the discussion on civil society saying:

“Civil society is public opinion, or the street, as part of civil society. NGOs
definitely, the social forces that may not always be organized, for example certain
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minorities, Christians, women, entities that cohesively represent a certain voice in
society but aren’t always organized, I think they factor in. So I think civil society
is the social balance to the politics of government, I kind of think of their role as
in the socio-economic sphere.”
Her answer remained consistent with other responses though she brings up some
interesting points. Firstly, she mentions “the street” and “entities that cohesively
represent a certain voice in society but aren’t always organized”- it seems to me that she
is, rightfully, including much of civil society that may not be represented by CSOs, or the
informal sector. Secondly, she mentions that civil society is “the social balance to
politics of government” working mainly in the socio-economic sphere as she refers to the
sector’s role in development and improving socio-economic status of individuals and
groups. Still, in the eyes of local NGO workers, one can see how these responses are
often outside of the political realm and mainly concerned with economic development,
much like the work of charity organizations and most NGOs both local and international.
Then I asked her if she considered her organization to be a part of Egyptian civil society
along with whether for-profit organizations are civil society. She quickly responded
saying,

“Yes definitely. I think its interesting because we are noticing a shift in Egypt and
globally towards social entrepreneurship, social finance, CSR, and I think that is
making for profit businesses more part of civil society but I think in of in itself not
necessarily.”
Again, she makes it clear that the private sector has a role to play within civil society.
This is certainly true considering the lack in funding and overall capacity for CSOs, still,
there seems to be a trend that civil society is less involved in political development as it is
with economic development.
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Local NGOs, particularly those I have interviewed, seem to rely their focus on the
socio-economic arena to avoid heavy government regulation. There are charity
organizations, those interested in education and health services, corporate social
responsibility, and a limited number of locally registered NGOs outside of this realm.
They avoid political development and have little interest in challenging government,
knowing that their organization’s existence relies on consent from government, or
political society. While the work of these organizations can be successful with plenty of
positive results, it appears that NGOs will always be employed within the socioeconomic sector because of deteriorating economic conditions, rather than lobbying and
challenging the government or political status-quo (arguably the entity to blame for
socio-economic deterioration).

c. Foreign Governments
In a fortunate circumstance, I was finally able to reach a member of the U.S.
government, more specifically a member of USAID, a primary donor for CSO’s in Egypt.
USAID is funded by American taxpayers and works according to the agenda and interests
of the U.S. state department. Basically they are a full-fledged foreign government
organization that has had an influential hand in the development field as well as Egyptian
civil society. Many organizations could not survive without the funding received from
USAID.
On a this hot summer afternoon, a day after the supposed ‘crisis’ involving
protesters at the U.S. Embassy on the anniversary of the September 11th attacks, I met a
high ranking official in the Democracy and Governance sector of USAID. We intended
for the interview to convene within the U.S. compound, which looks like a fortress and is
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one of the largest USAID headquarters worldwide, however they would not allow me to
bring my cell phone or recording equipment. Instead we went for a walk, perhaps
fittingly to the Cinnabon around the corner to discuss the matters of Egyptian civil
society.
I asked him what he thought of Egyptian civil society, whether he considered
international NGOs to be Egyptian civil society, and ultimately ended with whether
USAID, with all the funding they give to Egyptian civil society, should be considered to
be a part of that sector (mostly for laughs).

“Well, by definition it’s any non-governmental actor. So, it starts on community
organizations, and just a bunch of people getting together for whatever reason,
whether religious or non religious, and it goes all the way up to the most
organized civil society organizations that have funds from 10 different donors that
have implementing for 50 years. And of course there are international
organizations as well that are falling into those categories. And there are other
CSO’s in areas that are involved in political areas or close to political areas,
community empowerment, human rights, and you have other organizations that
are very non-political, apolitical and they are focused on service delivery, health,
education, you know.”
On whether he considers international organizations to be a part of Egyptian civil society:
“Yeah, some people do and some people don’t. It is strange, it’s the basic
question of what is civil society, so many different interpretations, and so when
you start off with that premise being so different, it’s hard to then draw some firm
conclusions, because if everybody starts at a different premise and then they go
off in a different direction.”
On whether he considers USAID to be any part of Egyptian civil society?
“No, we don’t consider ourselves a part of Egyptian civil society, I mean it is a
part of the United States government, and so what USAID’s position is in both
Egypt and around the world is that civil society organizations as well as inside
the US can play a vital role in helping to provide services to people, to help
empower people, to build their capacity, to meet basic needs of human beings and
of advancing civil society in various ways. So, we ourselves are trying to help
facilitate that but we’re not part of that. Of course our role has been highly
controversial.”
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USAID is not a member of Egyptian civil society though the sector receives heavy
funding from them. This of course has implications as their funding is used as a tool to
steer or guide the nation in their direction, as they believe that empowering civil society
results in democratization. However, many organizations that receive their funding will
not perform the function of civil society, for instance holding government accountable.
Rather, it appears that USAID is content “buying” off organizations that will act as civil
society instead of actually empowering civil society.
Fortunately, I was able to interview two development contractors in Egypt that are
employed by mostly for-profit development companies that work and implement USAID
projects. Both have worked for several years with a number of organizations in Egypt,
international NGOs and for-profit development companies that ultimately implement
USAID projects in various socio-economic areas.
First we have Pete, an American development contractor who happened to be
without work at the time of the interview. He was open and helpful during the interview
even when dealing with several controversial questions. I asked him what he considered
to be civil society, and quite simply, he wasn’t sure.

“That’s why I had to ask because I’m not quite sure. I mean all the companies for
profit have an effect on society, they are big, they are here, and regardless of
what they are doing with their profits they definitely have an effect on society.
Civil society I mean I would take out the government I guess, but I would include
for-profit companies.”
Next I spoke with another development contractor who now works as a
development consultant in various economic fields. This was his response when I asked
him to explain to me Egyptian civil society:
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“To me civil society is, typically, non-governmental organizations that work in
anything from classic development activities that could be related to education,
literacy, agriculture, public health issues, and other issues that are important to
society outside the realm of the formal government arena. Community groups,
like-minded groups that come together and focus on issues.”
Then he responded to my question regarding whether his work is part of civil society,
saying:
“We’ve worked with Egyptian organizations that you can say are part of civil
society, in a broad sense. For example, we work with associations frequently.
Those associations can be small farmer associations, which are organized under
the civil society law- under the ministry of social affairs (or solidarity). Those are
community organizations focusing on how they can work together for the benefit
of all the farmers involved to make more money through the production of better
fruits and vegetables. Other colleagues work with how they can manage and
strengthen that association so that they can better serve its members of the
community. In the past I’ve worked with the Egyptian Chefs association who work
in hotels, resorts, restaurants. But again, around this mission of professional
development, to help chefs be better chefs- the other one was to help farmers be
better farmers. That also included technical assistance with the association so
that it could better manage itself and better serve its members.”
Speaking with these development contractors led me to a few relevant points. One point
is that the definition of civil society in Egypt continues to be difficult to define. One of
them wasn’t sure how to define it by admitting his lack of knowledge of the sector. The
second interview indicates that when his company does work with civil society it is
focused entirely in the socio-economic realm, primarily promoting neoliberal economic
principles (i.e. Structural adjustment programs) of the ‘West’, WB, and IMF.

d. Activists and Initiatives
Next on the list of interviewees comes a group of individuals who find themselves
involved in several areas tied to “the local”. They are the ones who work informally,
mostly with little funding beyond what they are able to muster from their side jobs,
without an office, without a financial motive, and with the intention of challenging a
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government that has made life difficult in a multitude of areas for the majority of the
population. This group of men and women were active in the streets surrounding Tahrir
Square, the epicenter of the Egyptian revolution in Cairo. They were active in organizing,
advocacy, micro-management, poster making, providing food, cleaning streets,
commemorating the martyrs, and eventually becoming involved with the growing
political movements that in some cases were born in Tahrir. The best way to describe
them is as “activists”, they work according to the heartbeat of ‘the street’ they were not
originally politically affiliated though several have taken on inclusive, popular agendas
and believe all members of society deserve their rights. Some of them have crossed paths
with large youth movements such as, April 6th movement, Kefaya, Revolutionary Youth,
and many more. Some have taken beatings or seen their comrades beaten at the hands of
security forces, others have witnessed attacks on them by rivaling political forces, some
spent time in jail and others spend their time organizing amongst their peers. Beginning
within six or seven years prior to the revolution up until the post-revolution era, their
work has been never-ending and is no less important. The time is now for this group of
people who are often the closest to reality when it comes to understanding and living
within an eroded political, social, and economic sphere. They themselves and their
friends, family, etc. are victims, they are the closest to understanding the importance of
the revolution, the need to continue challenging government, and that they are not the
same civil society as the ones they have heard of- the ones that receive millions of dollars
in funding, support from foreign governments, and have high-rise corporate offices
arranging development initiatives. They are trying to develop the people around them,
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with constant discussion, protest marches, and face-to-face lobbying amongst their
detractors.
One man I spoke with I met on the one-year anniversary of the revolution in
Tahrir square. His name is Mo and at first glance he appeared to be a leader, standing at
the front of a large tent that him and his ‘colleagues’ assembled, with the names and
photos of the martyrs, those who had passed, during the revolution. He was micromanaging a garbage clean up (which I took part in), occasionally dabbling in poster
making, and speaking with interested bystanders who had questions about their motives
or agenda as a tented resident of the square. His responses always reflected the need to
care for the “new Egypt”; it’s people and governing with social justice as a top priority. It
was great to have met with him again, this time at a café in a narrow street behind the
square, to have some tea during the interview. Not sure of his experience with the term
civil society, still I went ahead and asked for his opinions. Mo explained:

“Civil society is the heartbeat of the street. Not just the street, any organization or
institution, or the nation, it’s also how we connect thought, and different beliefs of
the society. Civil society should be close to all levels of society; all levels of
society should find an equal balance within civil society.”
“Yes. I do consider myself as part of civil society. We need civil society to fix our
court, our ministry of justice, because everything seems to still be unjust. We are
never going to forget the Mubarak regime, because they destroyed civil society.
We need to learn from Mubarak’s regime because they were very cruel to us and
cruel to civil society and they destroyed it. Civil society vanished during the end
of the Mubarak regime. They also refused any suggestions civil society might
have had.”
Interestingly enough he does not seem to reference the NGO sector as a primary leader of
civil society while asserting that the sector is “the heartbeat of the street.” Additionally,
he makes a statement that no one else had mentioned before during my research, that civil
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society should be a part of all levels of society. This is a profound statement for two
reasons: firstly, that civil society, the one we most often come to hear about, is not
connected to all levels of society as Mo makes the point that it should be. Secondly, he
references “levels” of society, rather than considering the sector to be an all
encompassing space lying between the “state and the family.” An emphasis should be
made on these levels of the state, in a reference to James Ferguson; much of African civil
society is not on the grassroots or bottom level, as many believe, leaving it to be
dominated by transnational organizations, and government. While NGOs and formal
CSOs are explicit in their active involvement with urban and rural poor communities, it is
clear that Montasser does not see the same civil society I have become accustomed with
and is valued by much of academic community, as well as foreign and local governments.
Next I was fortunate enough to meet an incredibly active young woman, Maha, at
the headquarters of a small liberal political party called the Revolutionary Ghad. It was
relatively quiet with only a few men acting as security while they sipped tea and
conversed. With a great smile and a charming personality, her political will appears
unbroken and more willing than ever to swallow challenges that surely will lay ahead of
them, no thanks to the government. As a leading activist, she bravely campaigns for
expanding women’s rights in a time where there is a conservative counterattack in favor
of patriarchal principles. Stones and other hard, oddly shaped materials have been thrown
towards their marches, as a thin row of men take the blows by surrounding decently sized
crowds of fed up women who chant in unison for their equal individual rights. And yet
they continue to organize rallies and courageously march throughout downtown Cairo.
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This is what she said when I asked her what she believed to be civil society and whether
she was a part of that:

“Civil society needs to serve the people, all kinds of people, in jail or outside jail,
unemployed or employed, educated or uneducated. I try to work with civil society,
as much as I can, helping, calling, receiving calls, doing what I consider are my
duties. Anyone who is willing to give up his effort is part of civil society, and I am
willing, I try to work in the streets as much as I can. I met a lot of people that
went to jail, got tortured, I’ve tried to help them as much as I can with whatever is
in my reach. I am part of civil society in a direct and indirect way. What I try to
do is transport the voice of the people from the streets to wherever the media, or
wherever it needs to go.”
With her eyes filling with tears, you could feel her passion and love for the people she
serves was interminable. She speaks of an energetic civil society where one volunteers
their time to either help the less fortunate or as she said, “making calls, receiving calls”
and to help in any way possible when it comes to the plights of the street. She also
explains that she has a role to transport the voice of the street to those who are listening,
this does not sound like one civil society where democracy thrives and all voices are
heard. It sounds as if the voice of the people is almost separate from the formally
functioning, more recognizable, supposed civil society- which is actually supposed to be
the location for the opinions, voices, and debates of the so called heartbeat of the street.
All and All you wonder to yourself where are CSOs in all of this, where is their work in
empowering those in the street or the majority of people when the people themselves are
seemingly doing what they can on their own and with limited resources?
Next, I met with a young woman named Sally who I met through my interview
with Relief International. Sally is what you may call a woman of many trades, a student,
dentist, activist, and a leader of several informal organizations known as ‘initiatives.’
Together with many individuals and groups she met in her hometown of Alexandria

96

during the revolution, she co-founded what were once small gatherings of volunteers that
have since become a few thousand strong youth force to reckon with. These initiatives
were put together with the intention of doing “good” for the Egyptian people, especially
for civic engagement, without the legal red tape that is obligatory when an organization
or NGO is started. Instead these young adults bypass the legal process and only have to
find locations, such as auditoriums, which may hold these large groups of volunteers.
Here the magic happens. They create ideas, focus groups, hold workshops and motivate
their members to become leaders for the issues they individually care about. Whatever
work they do, it’s done in a creative and innovative manner, the need little funding and
are able to sustain their work by members volunteering a few hours a week of their time
to do their part. Sally said something to me during the interview that will always stick
with me, “it should never be difficult to make positive change in your community.” She
said this with a hint of frustration quickly masked by her upbeat and positive personality.
I went ahead and asked her the important question, what did she think was Egyptian civil
society?

“It is more or less an organization that stimulates social change, but not military,
not governmental. This a huge difference, the difference between charity and
development, because the majority who do charity say they are doing
development, but no, doing charity or relief is not really development, it is
immediate relief not long term relief.”
Sally makes the quick distinction between charity work, which dominates much of the
local NGO scene in Egypt, and development organizations that have long-term goals for
society. Her explicit discounting of charity organizations as civil society, it seems, was a
direct attack on the hundreds of NGOs that consider them to be civil society, are also able
to receive international funding, and that work without a sustainable model for society.
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Charity is a short-term solution that does not bring to light the root of the primary
problems associated with providing humanitarian relief to the needy. While it can be
affective and millions in Egypt are in need of some kind of relief, the problems will
continue to grow for the next generation if organizations do little to confront the root
causes. Next, I asked her to describe what she is involved in and how it is connected or a
part of Egyptian civil society:

“It works like any formal group, usually they start because of a charismatic
person who leads or motivates people to join him or her, usually students or
recently graduated to didn’t find work yet, and they don’t want to be committed
full time to development work but at the same time they want to do something. The
best solution is the initiative thing. The first initiative in Egypt was Adwar, in
2005, in Alexandria, it was the first one who announced themselves with a
professional foundation, but without being a foundation. They have a really cool
story: “you and I want to do something, but society doesn’t give us a chance,
because of this, we everyone has to play a role, you get a role, I get a role, we all
take a role.”
“Everyone plays their role. I think these are the civil society organizations, not
necessarily the really established NGOs. Because for example, Adwar, the first
initiative, produced the most now political activists that represent Alexandria and
they work now in Cairo. So these initiatives maybe they are not really visible, but
they develop a lot the capacity of their members. So, you really help their
awareness, and building capacity, which I think is the aim of the other NGOs, but
the other NGOs really work for their name. But these other people work for both
individually and the name of the initiative.”
“We also do programs with juniors, from like 11 to 16. Because everyone are
trying to develop the youth, but people already have their personalities formed
already, but if you target a younger audience this can be better for the country.
We try and show them how the real world goes but in a really simple way. I think
Egyptian civil society is one of the strongest civil societies ever.”
“Another very good initiative is Open Space initiative. They promote using space
in a creative way, for contemporary art, for political messages, street art, graffiti,
street dance, flash mob etc. What’s great about initiatives is that they utilize ‘new’
and ‘creative’ techniques. Initiatives are definitely civil society.
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Sally had zero doubt in her face when she said that Egyptian civil society is “one of the
strongest civil societies ever” and that that initiatives are central to the sector. The work
that they conduct constantly involves reaching out to the population and either building
awareness or the capacity of their members. They all are considered leaders and they
volunteer their time selflessly in order to make a positive contribution to their informal
organization. The function and work conducted by these initiatives appear to be the
grassroots actor that most academics cite as civil society, though without the credit,
funding, or accolades. The members value education, being aware, increasing citizen
activity, and the health of their home, Egypt. Yet they continue to work under the radar,
out of sight from national government, and with minimal contact with transnational
NGOs, because of their supposed “illegitimacy”.
Finally, I was able to reach another activist, a friend, and someone, who similar
many others in this section, committed their lives to work for the good of society and the
country. His background in human rights, non-violent action, and organizing led him to
the forefront of the Kefaya and April 6th movement as well as playing an active and
influential role in the uprising against the government. Because he was out of the country
at the time of the interview, we proceeded to meet on the video chat “Skype” to discuss
his opinions on civil society. However instead I asked him about whether he believed
international NGOs are Egyptian civil society and whether they should continue to have
an active supporting role. He responded by saying:

“We have to be very realistic, how could Egyptian civil society survive without
donations, without donors, without funding. Most of them, at least the ones who
do a good job, have no local source of funding. So the only way to receive any
funding, or to get any training, or whatever, is to look outside, abroad, foreign
organizations, international organizations and whether they are governmental
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and non-governmental, and whether they are civil. So in this case, it is a little bit
complicated and we have to widen our perspective a little bit. This is a necessity,
it is a symbiotic relationship, and without it they would die. But do you consider
them to be a part of Egyptian civil society? If they are working to serve Egyptian
people, in Egypt, then they are part of that civil society. If we look at an
organization like, I don’t know, Freedom House, it is funded by the U.S. But is it a
governmental organization is it part of a ministry? No, it is not official. It is a
civilian organization that deals with civil society in Egypt, so it is within the
category.”
Here Ahmed lays out his justifications for international NGO work because of the fear
that local, smaller organizations would lose funding, lack the necessary technical support,
will ultimately lose their sustainability. While he brings up an important point, it seems to
me that formal local organizations are at the helm of their international counterparts and
essentially have to work towards the results, needs and agenda of the donor. Moreover,
the point he makes clearly implies that many CSOs in Egypt are just barely getting by
and will do what is necessary to receive funding in order to sustain their work and
livelihoods. It is clear that the support given by transnational organizations is clearly
appreciated and needed, however at what costs will civil society have to endure this
relationship when the bottom line is that the primary reason civil society suffers is
because of government, which just so happens to be a central counterpart of transnational
organizations.
Here in this section we have highlighted the opinions and voices of distinct social
forces of both civil society and the state. My research has led me to interviews with
members from the local and international NGO community, foreign governments or
affiliate organizations, activists, community youth organizers, the Mosque, Orthodox
Church, and the Muslim Brotherhood to improve my understanding of what civil society
organizations and individuals deem to be “Egyptian civil society”. Using the voices of a
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wide range of opinions has brought the opportunity to balance, compare, and juxtapose
the relatively different variations of what civil society is in Egypt. The next section, using
the same outlining process, I will present the same interviews in order to discuss and
analyze opinions on government interaction and how their actions affect civil society.

Civil Society and Government: How close is too close?
a. Level of Interaction with Government
i. International NGO’s
This section analyzes to what extent there are government restrictions and on the
type of relationship social forces of civil society have with political society. This section
will also reveal whether organizations cannot accomplish work without government,
cannot sustain without government, or are carrying out the work of government on the
same hierarchical level of the state.
Lets begin again with the interview with CARE International’s country director.
About half way through I took some time to ask about and discuss CARE’s interactions
with government. First I asked him how his organization interacts with government.

“Well Local NGOs of course are different than international NGOs. We are much
less highly regulated, much less highly controlled, so there is a real role for
international NGOs here in Egypt to support local NGOs, and to be able to do
things and say things on behalf of local NGOs that local NGOs wouldn’t dare to
sometimes say. And like I said, all local NGOs are given money by the ministry of
social development… they all need to have any money that they receive from us,
they need to have it approved in writing, even donations need to have approval,
so they are quite tightly regulated, where is with us, we basically report to the
ministry of social development which has an NGO branch to it. We are generally,
fairly lightly regulated and we are supposed to give reports on a regular basis of
what we are doing, but they don’t have to be advanced reports. They can be like
here in the last 6 months and show funding and how we are using it. The way the
government can control us is by controlling the local partners. They don’t care so
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much about what we’re doing they care a lot more about what local partners are
doing.”
On whether the interaction between CARE and government positively or negatively
affects the services the organization provides:

“Yeah, government support is critical for us. That’s kind of the third leg, local
partners but also government. And we have a lot of success from local
government. The real hard part is national government, in Egypt as in most cases,
local government is much more responsive, much more understanding of needs on
the ground, they’re sometimes themselves impacted or their families are impacted
by a lack of services. They are closer to the local community and feel more
accountable to the community, so we have a lot of really strong local government
ties, local ministry people, local governorate people, and that’s where we put a
lot of our efforts in, explaining what we are doing, presentations, getting their buy
in… you know at the end of a project you want the government to have picked up
the ideas, objectives, and you can’t do that unless they share the ideas and
objectives in the first place… so, government is definitely critical, but the tough
one is national government.”
In his response to the question around government interaction, he explains the difference
between local and international state control and capabilities. It seems that government is
more fearful of local NGOs, likely because their interests as an organization are different.
Local NGOs, other than charities, who are the most capable of reaching a broader
audience, have a difficult time organizing workshops on civic engagement, the
constitution, governance, corruption, basically areas that are deemed a threat to the state’s
power. International NGOs on the other hand have an easier time implementing their
work yet they certainly have trouble reaching the broader target audience, as they simply
do not have an interest in challenging the local government with a politicized message. I
wonder if these international organizations, that have working relationships with
government, have thought of challenging the state’s restrictions on local organizations?
Would this empower local organizations and put international organizations out of work
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if the local were able to function without persecution and suppression? Compelling
thought. Furthermore, international NGOs seem to be put up on a pedestal, indicating that
the state may have less power over transnational organizations as they often perform
similar work that the state is responsible for. The following question was whether
CARE’s relationship with the government positively or negatively affects your
relationship with other local NGOs. His response reflects a recurring theme of confusion
as to what it is civil society can do in Egypt:

“Yeah, well Egypt has become a bit complicated of course. Under Mubarak, life
was a lot simpler in many ways. I mean you knew the people who had been there
for a long time, the policies were in place, everything was clear on what you
could do what you couldn’t do, both for us and local NGOs. Now, it is much more
unclear, there is a new NGO law that has been going through parliament and
now there is no parliament anymore… So what are the policies in terms of civil
society? Nobody knows, what are the policies in terms of cooperating with foreign
funded entities and all this business? Nobody knows, so it has become a lot more
difficult.”
Here it is clear that under Mubarak, there was indeed a status quo, an awareness of where
one stood within the state as a civil society, and which boundaries could not be crossed.
Also, this NGO worker is correct in his statement, it would have been a simpler system
for the NGO sector, especially for INGOs, to not challenge the status-quo, to accept
discriminatory policies, and to ultimately do some socio-economic ‘good’ while
sustaining the organization’s survival in an important international branch. There is a
direct correlation to the transnational nature of this organization and the bilateral
agreements made between government and supposed civil society leaders. CARE, as well
as several INGOs, functions under an agreement with the government saying that they
will work under a specific mandate with obvious restrictions. Ministries of the
government regulate all funding to the NGO sector and CSOs, which requires all
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exchanges of funds to be reported. If the government dislikes the use of funding, an
organization’s work will be halted and could cease to exist, particularly in the case of a
local registered organization.

“Local partners see us as a bit of an umbrella to protect them. If they are getting
funding from us, we’ll often help them. If the ministry sees that ‘youth for
development and environment’ in Minya, a local NGO, is getting money from
CARE, and if they know CARE, which they do, they are more likely to say okay
this looks fine, we’ll sign off on it. If the NGO is getting money from Qatar, or
some entity the ministry doesn’t really know, there is going to be a lot more
question, about where is the money coming from, why does it come here, what are
you going to do with it, all this kind of stuff… so to some extent we have a
symbiotic relationship with our local partners that we need them for local
knowledge, local implementation, local constituency, and they need us for
legitimacy, for training, capacity building, and they need us for lobbying and
advocacy for the government. They other reason is their reach doesn’t often
extend nationally, there are very few NGOs in Egypt that work on the local level
as well as the national level, and that is a big weakness here. And that is one of
our niches we see with CARE, because we have 4 field offices, we have field staff,
and so although the local partners do the work, still our field staff interacts a lot
with local communities, partners, and so we get a lot of information about what is
happening, what people want, what people need. For example in the water sector,
if you read the statistics, officially it says 96 percent of Egyptians have access to
household to water. Where is I can give you examples of many villages in Beni
Suef, just 2 hours south of Cairo, where 40 percent of the households don’t have a
water tap. So you wouldn’t know that unless you actually worked in Beni Suef,
talked to local government, and then dug deeper and talked to local civil society,
then actually went into households and things like that. It takes a lot of work to do
that, so that is a big weakness in Egypt. You either have advocacy groups, at the
national level, or you have these local implementers and there is not a strong link
between the two.”
What must be said, in regards to the point that local partners use the influence of
transnational organizations to protect and work as an “umbrella”, is that, although having
protection from government is certainly a positive result of INGO influence, it also
means that the government’s influence within civil society grows through these
relationships. INGOs certainly want to work with local organizations that are “compliant”
and “legitimate” in the eyes of the government, especially in order to maintain their
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working relationship with political society. Firstly, a “legitimate” local organization
suggests that it is “registered” with the government and is authorized to work as a nongovernmental organization. Secondly, to be registered requires an organization’s funding
to come from either a government ministry, which is limited and allows government to
control the funds and ultimately the work of NGOs, a local source which is limited, or an
international source which is in many ways unlimited but highly regulated. The
government is then aware of funding, who it is coming from and how it is being used,
which allows for political society to maneuver against civil society and maintain the state
dynamics of power- or status quo. Is this a positive result for local organizations? No,
because their work as a civil society becomes more regulated, obviously less political,
highly controlled by donors, and will maintain similar dynamics and hierarchical levels
of power within the state. I believe the NGO sector will claim that they do what they can
with the space provided, which is not a whole lot.
With my interview with Plan Egypt, the country director was less than
enthusiastic when discussing their interaction with government as an INGO. I asked him
firstly how his organization interacts with government, his response being:

“Well we have the ministry of social solidarity that supervises all NGOs, except
for CARE; they have a special presidential decree. Anyway, we have to be
supervised by the ministry of social solidarity, and the minister was confirmed to
continue since the revolution, but the point is we used to have monthly meeting
with the undersecretary of the minister of social solidarity, and I had my monthly
meeting with the ministry as well. It’s actually okay, especially at the local level;
there is a very good relationship that the Egyptian staff knows very well how to
have a positive relationship with them. But then you have this security system,
which are not actually the security people, but within social solidarity there are
security guys who are in all the meetings, and approves or disapproves things.
They have this idea that there is a potential of something political. On a personal
side, what happens to any of us that go out, I can’t leave the city without being
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‘followed’. Normally on field trips when our staff goes, well there is some strange
guy and he’s the security guy.”
“Approval. There is a registration, and they have to have an approved board.
Most CDAs have to have government functionaries on the board. And everything
is yearly audited, and ours do because we are heavily supervised.”
Not surprisingly, his answer reflects the over-regulation and control that is discussed
thoroughly by fellow CSOs. I asked him if his relationship with the government assists
or makes the delivery of their services more difficult:

“Of course. But, it is a real unique sort of situation. The messiest democracy I
worked in was Bangladesh, another big country, hugely populated, Muslim,
where the government is really ineffective. So we could do a lot of stuff, but not
very effectively with government institutions, it’s even hard to meet people in
higher levels of government. So everything we do is pure civil society, tons of
NGOs, the Mecca of NGOs. Here there are very few NGOs, international,
compared to other countries because of all these restrictions. Actually I have seen
opportunities, where there is a certain amount of stability in a dictatorship
bureaucracy; there is not as much change and more stability. And we found
opportunities to even talk to ministers, we just signed an agreement with the
minister of youth, and the Muslim Brotherhood is going to take over that one. The
dictatorship over all these years created this control system that is top-down
controlled, so the bottom, even though it’s stable, it is totally unaccountable.”
Here the interviewee makes two important points. First, he reflects a need for stability for
civil society, yet recognizes that the stability provided by a dictatorship is no agent for
change, inevitably resulting in the ineffective development of society as a whole. Second,
he describes the “top-down” system of control seen under Mubarak where the “bottom”
is unaccounted. In this case then, where do INGOs stand in this vertical, “top-down”
system if they carry out functions of government and arrange ministerial meetings while
also representing a constituency that is at the “bottom” of this system? This question will
be elaborated and discussed later.
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The interview with Relief International inevitably led to my curiosity of what
their interactions with government are like. Three of the four responded with a spirited
debate on the extent of government registration for both local and international NGOs.

“R1: First of all, there are contacts between civil society and government- this is
a must. For example, in order to start, you must have contact with the
government.
R3: I guess you can register with different ministries; you can register with
ministry of foreign affairs, also with the ministry of social affairs. Different
International organizations register with different ministries.
R2: It is a requirement, for an international NGO, to register with both. We apply
with the ministry of foreign affairs and then second we apply ministry of social
affairs.
R3: It depends because I know some foundations applied with just one ministry so
I think it has to do with status.
R2: CARE for example, and a few others are with the ministry of international
cooperation, since the 50’s, but all other organizations, registered INGOs, are
registered through both ministries. We are waiting to be approved as an INGO,
we are legally not working because we are not registered yet.
R3: Because we have submitted the papers, and they know of our submission, RI
is working through formal compartments to implement a project- but we are
technically not supposed to be working ourselves”
This debate not only reveals the complicated process and red tape necessary to cross in
order to become a functioning and legitimate NGO in Egypt, but also that NGOs are
meant to have a working relationship with their respective ministries- making any kind of
political development a difficult and nearly impossible feat.

ii. Local NGO’s
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Next this section will present and discuss the responses of a couple local NGOs in
regards to their interactions with government. Masr Al Kheir responds to my question by
saying:

“There is a required reporting with the Ministry of Social Affairs, their policies
govern us. For example if we need to do relations or cooperation with an
international agency, we need to have the approval with the ministry of social
affairs.” What makes it easy or difficult to receive approval?
“Well we have two phases, one before the revolution and one after the revolution.
After, I guess it is not settled yet, we don’t know how easy it is or how hard it is to
get approval, but before it was quite hard. You had to do a lot of work and it takes
time. You have to get the approval from the security as well. Dealing with the
government you cannot expect anything. There are no specific, clear rules.”
I then asked if their relationship with the government makes it difficult or assists them in
providing services. One of the two responded by saying:

“The government makes it easy to provide services. If we want to work in Upper
Egypt or in a village, you need the support of the governor or the mayor and the
local people. So we meet them and we establish good relations with them and so
they help us provide services and projects- they welcome us.”
Here the interviewees acknowledge the difficult and confusing relationship with
government yet believe that they are necessary to collaborate with. They see this as
necessary relationship because if they did not have the support of local or national
government, then their projects would be undermined and ultimately fail. So what we are
seeing is that government has become such an influential partner that CSOs want to
receive support and praise from them- further developing a relationship of inferiority. It
seems that successful development is not possible without government assistance or
cooperation. Civil society members then become arms of the government and therefore
become incapable of performing their functions as a CSO. In certain cases it seems
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appropriate to withdraw supposed CSOs from civil society, as these organizations are not
what they appear.
For the next local NGO, Education for Employment in Egypt, the government
interaction is much of the same as is Masr Al Kheir. They deal with government only
through the approval process, for instance for program funding. Farah responded to two
of my questions surrounding government interaction by saying:

“We are a local organization and we are a part of a affiliate network, so there
are EFE’s all over the region, and we have a sister organization in Europe. But
what’s great about the organization is that each affiliates functions completely
independently in accordance with the local governance. So our interaction is that
we are registered with the Ministry of social solidarity, all NGOs have to be, all
our funds have to be approved by the Ministry of Social Solidarity, but besides
that, we don’t really work directly with governance- its more for approvals more
than anything.”
And when I asked her if the government in any way affect the services they
provide, she responded with, “No. Not at all, the biggest thing is approval. But
besides that, there is very little interaction. Because of the split within the
ministry of social solidarity there is a lot of confusion because a lot of people
don’t really know which ministry is handling what.”
As an organization that specializes in education, the interaction with government is
minimal and becomes less of a problem, as they are not a political threat. Most NGOs do
not involve themselves in the political realm, out of fear or disinterest, and are made up
of humanitarian organizations that provide charity, education and health services. Though
they still must seek approval from government, NGO work is strongly encouraged to be
apolitical and exist within the regulatory system, for the sake of national security.

iii. Foreign Government
Here the interaction between the national Egyptian government with a foreign
government counterpart will be presented and discussed. In the case of USAID, who is
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celebrating their fiftieth anniversary in Egypt, my interview with a staff member of the
controversial Democracy and Governance sector will discuss their relationship with the
national government. Firstly I asked him to discuss the interaction between USAID and
Egyptian government:
“The vast majority of our money is actually in bilateral agreements that we would
have with the ministry of justice to implement an automation system to improve
the way the court systems function. Or with the ministry of local development we
work on ways that we can put into effect a de-centralization law and roll that out,
or with the ministry of health… you know, these kinds of things with different
ministries. And we sign agreements with them, and some of them actually have a
component where there’s going to be funding for local CSO’s out of that, like
some complementary piece. So we call that our bilateral programs, and then we
have unilateral programs that we’ve chosen to do on our own. So, this is where
the controversy lays, but with all these bilateral programs we’re working
extremely closely, I mean our staff on a daily or weekly basis are working hand in
hand with government counterparts, and our implementing partners need to do
the same.”
There are several interesting points to take from this response. Firstly, the majority of
funds are distributed to bilateral agreements between various ministries of government.
USAID works side by side, and therefore work on the same governmental level as the
Egyptian government. They then involve CSOs, that they have approved, that can
implement their projects. This makes it appear, to USAID, as if their funds are being
transferred to “real” civil society organizations that are implementing government
planned development project. Secondly, the rest of their funding goes towards unilateral
agreements. Unilateral agreements imply the solo nature of this portion of their funding
as they develop their own projects without government interference, meant for the
Egyptian people, as if they were actually government themselves. USAID, in this
instance, work “above” the state, and are carrying out functions of the state. The next
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question I asked the USAID staff member to discuss was the approval process with
government in order to carry out their funded projects:

“Well, umm, this is the controversial issue. The government of Egypt, well some
people in the former regime were saying that we needed to actually receive their
approval before doing anything. And our contention, especially after the
revolution, was that we wanted to work directly with the people of Egypt. And we
informed the government about the projects that we had this idea to do, the vast
majority of our money is with bilateral programs and this was actually a
relatively small portion of this overall gigantic assistance that we provide to the
government of Egypt. But they weren’t comfortable with that foresight. We
actually have laws that prevent us from having the host government veto our
projects. So we have some legal restrictions on our end too, but of course any law
84 registered NGO has to of course, well first of all they have to have been
registered, and secondly they need project approval from the ministry of social
affairs.
Aboul Naga, the Minister of International Cooperation, was in charge of
our bilateral agreements, and so her contention was that we went outside this
scope, of the bilateral agreements. So there have been exchanges back and forth
but it has been controversial since 2005 but then we assumed that there had been
a revolution and that some of the old rules wouldn’t apply, but I mean as we saw
in this transition period, there is a lot of remnants. But I’m fairly optimistic with
this new government at least up until a couple days ago (Protests at the US
embassies in Libya, Egypt, Yemen, etc.), that there was going to be a lot more
interest in collaborating with the United States government, as it had been under
the interim regime. With IMF and these types of things, they are approaching us
with concrete ideas and ways they want us to help their government to improve.”
The controversy he is referring was during and following the revolution, USAID was
providing international and local NGOs with funding without the consent of the Egyptian
government, although USAID felt it was within their guidelines of the unilateral
agreements. In this case, it was the Egyptian government that felt threatened by the work
of USAID and the fact that they had undermined the nation’s sovereignty. The
controversy reveals both a differing agenda and the disappearing lines between the
Egyptian government and it’s foreign government allies. The interviewee was heavily
aware of the controversy, seemed to understand why it was controversial, and yet, they
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will continue to collaborate and work side by side with the Egyptian government for the
sake of their interests in the region. Moreover, his response made a few points clear in
regards to the USAID relationship with Egypt, 1.the U.S. has laws that prevent and
restrict the host government from vetoing an agreed project 2. USAID will only work
with registered NGOs and these NGOs still are required to have project approval from the
Ministry of Social Affairs, and 3. The newly elected government appears to have a higher
interest, than the previous regime, in working and collaborating with the U.S.
government. These three points are not only controversial but ensures their support that
the status quo from political society and civil society will continue as is. USAID has
leverage over the Egyptian government and are then working above the state level, they
will continue to associate and collaborate with NGOs that have little to zero political
involvement, and because their relationship with the Egyptian government is improvingit appears they will continue to work as they have over the previous decades. The final
question asked, out of curiosity, is whether the interactions with Egyptian government
allow USAID’s work to be more or less difficult.

“I think it’s mixed, I think that in some ways working directly with civil society
organizations is a faster way to deliver services, but, it can be less sustainable.
Ideally, you want to be working with government counterparts whenever possible.
Well actually ideally what you would be doing is you would be funding a bilateral
program, and then you would have complimentary unilateral programs, that is if
you want to work on anti-corruption, you want to collaborate with a state audit
agency, you want to collaborate with the prosecutor general’s office, if you want
to collaborate with the ministry of justice, you know there are a whole bunch of
government organs that are dealing with the officials state-side of this. But then
you also want to be working for the demand side, you’d want to be working with
grass-roots organizations that are putting pressure upwards on transparency, on
asking for budgets to be made clear to everyone, so you want these programs and
them to be putting pressure on members of parliament to advocate for changes.
So ideally, from the perspective of a donor, you actually want to be working with
both levels, and what you’d really want is the government officials to buy in to the
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fact that if they get on the local level, advocacy for change, that this could
actually help them. And this is a much easier sell in principle; it’s a much easier
sell with the new government. Because with the new government you say look you
want to implement new policies, these are organizations that can help to do that. I
was at a session the day before yesterday with the member of the high election
commission and he was saying we have to collaborate with CSO’s because they
can do a much more effective job of civic education, voter education, they’re in
these communities, they can get up and help register people, I mean it is
remarkable to have a government official say that. I think it depends on the
individual and it depends on the ministry or whatever. But I think there is
recognition that, like in any place around the world, that there is a role to be
played by CSOs.”
Here, the result is evident- that working with government is the preferred venue for
USAID and is obviously beneficial for the host government, hardly surprising. He
believes civil society organizations to have a less sustainable affect, however is this not
due to government regulation? Furthermore, in reference to a previous discussion that
civil society is supported and championed through policy, it is clear that they want to
“support civil society”, they want to work with grassroots organizations and that they
allocate funds for this purpose. However, it has become clear that there is more interest in
supporting a civil society that does not carry out the functions of civil society- for
instance putting pressure on government over various domestic issues- than supporting
organizations that will challenge the dynamics of power within the state. They do not
actually put pressure on the authoritarian government to respect rights, tackle corruption,
and decrease political society dominance in order to grow and expand space for civil
society actors to function in a manner that will develop society as a whole. This is made
evident on their website for USAID Egypt as they explain on their history page that they
are proudly involved in the development of the economy, health, and education services,
rather than developing governance and challenging human rights abuses by the state.
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Next, I asked one of the development contractors to discuss their affiliation with the
Egyptian government, if any at all. The interviewee, Pete, responded saying:

“Most of the USAID projects I have worked on have all been working with
government counterparts, other ministries. And US Wheat deals with for the most
part, the government and private millers and bakers. But as far as their direction
on what they can and cannot do, they advise the government on regulations and
they speak to the government for the most part for whom they can talk to and how
they can go about things. Almost every project I have worked on has done their
work through the government, or a government counterpart. Because you have
defined goals, you have agreed to a contract with defined goals with USAID, and
USAID has agreed with the Egyptian government what’s going to happen. So you
have to deal with the government no matter what they say, they can say no we no
longer want this or we are going to shift gears and change directions. You have to
deal with the government in order to get anything done. Politics and economics
are both an ends to each other… I think.”
Pete explains the deep relationship between government and USAID and how almost all
of the projects he has been involved with are worked out with government. There is a
deep relationship between development and government in Egypt although USAID
continues to fund what they believe to be civil society. The bottom line is that
development contractors for USAID and any government entity such as USAID work on
a state level, in some cases even above the state, and at the same time promote civil
society which hopes to scale back government. He then proceeded to respond to several
of my questions regarding development in Egypt and the agendas of various external
forces (the West, the Islamic bloc, and transnational organizations):

“Well let me put it this way: there are western goals and there are more Islamic
goals. That’s the divide right there. Within the western goals they can pretend or
think that they are all doing something different, but that’s not the way its viewed
by the Ikhwan or the Islamic side. Pumping money in for tourism, or for whatever
it may be, is viewed as something political and they are going to try and own
whatever happens here. But for example, a company like CARE and a company
like Cimonex would argue that they are doing two very different things. CARE
would say they are doing it for the people, we’re a non-profit, we work in grass
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roots. Cimonex would say well we are doing that too, but we do it for profit so we
also take projects that do such and such but we do it in a little bit of a different
way. But at the end, it’s all Western influence here, the more money that the west
can pump in will have an influence on the way the politics goes, and how society
evolves here. And the more money that the Saudi’s and Qatari’s can pump in may
support a counter measure to that. Is USAID money politically charged? Yes. I
think each individual project is yes, it is meant to make Egypt more western. And
it’s meant to integrate Egypt into the global system, as we define it. But at the end
of the day in Egypt, the Suez Canal, the fact that it has a border and a large army
on that border, with Israel, are all more important than the actual development
issue at hand. In general USAID is meant to stabilize Egypt, and bring it in to the
Western world, so that Egypt doesn’t attack Israel, doesn’t close the Suez Canal,
and keeps things favorable for the West. That’s my belief. USAID, World Bank,
EU, UN, these are all donors, and they all have different charters and different
agendas, which we are seeing right now, because they’re all trying to bring
money to Egypt to stabilize it. They are trying to make sure Egypt does not go into
a direction that will not deal with the West, or do something that the West doesn’t
like.”
He then made several interesting points in an attempt to differentiate between
development workers and their backgrounds:

“Also you have to distinguish between Aid workers. There are people who truly
believe in development and there are others who at some point in their career,
decide that they could make more money, would like to see the world, by doing
development work. For instance I worked in privatization projects and all those
people, they were all ex-wall street millionaires that decided they wanted an
easier life and they’d work for a couple years here and work for a couple years
there, and they had a lot of advice to give on developing a capitalist market,
developing the stock market, bond market, and all of that. They had advice to
give, but they weren’t doing it out of some love, maybe they were doing it out of
pride where they helped develop the Egyptian stock market, but they weren’t
doing it out of some love or betterment of the Egyptian people. Forgive me for
saying this but it’s the same thing with USAID employees, when USAID says you
are moving to another country, I don’t think they care what happens to the
Egyptian people, but at the end of the day, Americans look at it like it’s their
career, it’s their job, and they’re trying to do better for their family, and if they do
good elsewhere, that’s alright too.”
Here, Pete provides a detailed description of the types of people that work on these
USAID, WB, IMF projects, and distinguishes between those who know about the region
and those who don’t. Also, there are those that do development work in Egypt without
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necessarily involving themselves within society as they provide prescriptions to
government as an expert or consultant would.

iv. Activists and Initiatives
Finally, I present the research findings and opinions on the government
interactions between various activists of “the street”. Interestingly enough, this is a
limited discussion. The interviews discussed previously in this section involve civil
society actors, or influential actors within the state that affect civil society, that either
work closely with government or find themselves heavily restricted by them. Also, these
interviews were with “formal” actors of society, meaning they are registered and
monitored in some capacity by the government. For the following interviews, these
members of ‘the street’ are just civilians and do not belong to formal entities, in fact their
work is focused around what happens in the street as they play multiple roles for the sake
of their communities.
For these activists interactions with political society are limited though
significant. Their work is considered controversial because they advocate for issues that
are political in nature and that publically critiques the work of government. They have
shared experiences with government security forces having all witnessed and experienced
brutality, have been arrested or detained, though these experiences were not discussed in
depth. All three, similar to millions of Egyptians, have avoided working in a formal
manner due to their disagreements with government and, beginning with the revolution,
have increased their public involvement in the street. The public directs their causes as
they organize and advocate openly for those issues, which includes their discrepancies
with the role of government.
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For another active member of the “street”, Sally, she is heavily involved in the
organization of “initiatives” or informal groups of individuals who want to make a
difference in society. These individuals nearly all met because of the revolution, the
social movement that connected the majority of youth throughout the country. She cofounded an organization that has grown from single digits to nearly five thousand
members, as they actively participate and organize youth workshops, in multiple
governorates, that seek to empower, increase civic engagement, as well as spread
awareness of individual rights. A main concern for them is location to meet, where is a
safe place to organize when you know public organization will receive the attention of
the authorities. So what they do is contact accredited NGOs that are willing to host their
events and meetings, serving as an incubator or protective umbrella, in order to
legitimatize their gatherings. As a true member of civil society, Sally has her reasons for
engaging committing herself with ‘initiatives’, citing the lack in government oversight for
their success. I asked her, as an informal organization, how they are able to avoid
government regulation that would surely damage their work, she replied by saying:

“Not only that we don’t accept money but also because most of our members are
not full time free to help managing and directing. We have all of us involved in
other work, traveling or something; we want something to be a lifestyle- to
volunteer two hours per week at least. Instead of just sitting and doing nothing,
we can sit together and do something.”
She responds by saying that they avoid government, firstly by not directly accepting
funding, so in the case that they are in need of funds, they allow their incubator
organization to accept on their behalf. Also, they are not tied down to any NGO, as they
are willing and ready to move their meetings and events to anywhere else willing to host
them without restrictions. Additionally, all the members are volunteers and
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simultaneously maintain their careers in order to sustain their extra-curricular activities as
an initiative. Then Sally said something that had a profound affect on me: “it should
never by this difficult to do something positive for your community.” This statement
correctly sums up the frustrations of millions of Egyptian youth that are interested and
willing to work hard for the development of society but recognize the social and political
roadblocks that discourage them to do so. These individuals are not the civil society
members that reap the benefits of policy that supports civil society and are not recognized
by government as legitimate. They are politically engaged, actively question
government’s role in society, and they are not civil society actors that are empowered by
an external power, they did it all on their own by promoting all members to be active
leaders.
The activists discussed in this section are reminiscent of the grassroots CSOs that
had always been used to describe CSOs in theory or principle. However, they are not the
beneficiaries of support and because of their ‘informal’ status, are not technically
considered to be a part of civil society, according to the national government, foreign
governments, as well as by much of the NGO sector. There is something fundamentally
wrong when genuine civil society actors are labeled as threats to national security, while
supposed formal organizations receive funding and support for not actually playing their
role as active and influential members of civil society. And for those organizations that
do want to have an active role in putting pressure on government, they will receive the
most regulation and the least support because their projects and funding will not receive
government approval. This section reveals that activists, or members of “the street”, are
politically engaged and at the same time have the least government interactions. They see
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government as a road block to progress and will work with as many organizations or
people as possible to affectively advocate their message to political society.

Thinking about the Vertical Topography of power: Introduction of the
Civil Society Model
The earlier sections of analysis provided interviews and research outlined to reach
a general consensus of what civil society is in Egypt and whether it provides the
necessary social, political, and economic development that one comes to expect from the
democratization process. Using the research results and narratives of social forces of the
state, I will now present and discuss the necessary concerns with the recent thought and
literature of the “state” and “civil society” using a vertical topography of power as well as
why there must be a re-conceptualization of state-society relations. Following this
discussion will be an introduction to a civil society model that provides an insight into
civil society dynamics in Egypt.
James Ferguson’s piece, Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order
presents the African context and backdrop for the need of distinguishing the role of civil
society within the state and the differences between theoretical interpretations and the
way it is practiced in the “real world”. Recent academics in the realm of political science,
anthropology, and other humanity studies utilize a vertical topography of power in order
to understand state and civil society dynamics. This vertical topography of power,
mentioned previously, describes and displays the power dynamics within the nation-state,
implying that the “all-powerful and encompassing state” is at the top of the scale with the
“family” as Ferguson puts it, on the bottom, with a sandwich layering of various
institutions. The topography of power also vividly describes the appearance of a top-
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down approach by the state as it intervenes with the “bottom”, the villages, the homes,
and the family. This belief relies on civil society being the ‘in-between’ space within the
state, below government and above the family. The neoliberal approach to “state and
society” and movement for nation building and creating a world order that relies on the
universal laws of man, citizenship, and state, is one of the factors for ushering in civil
society. As Ferguson explains, “State-success, by contrast, means the construction of new
bases of authority resting on nation-state citizenship. Above the national level, finally,
appears the international, understood largely as (1) a source of “aid,” a helping hand in
nation-building; and (2) a utopian image of the union of nation-states, with the key
symbol of the United Nations as the promise of the universality of the nation form (cf.
Malkki 1994).” A successful state can only be successful when and if the global
community shows an endorsement, and this is made clear when a the nation that is in fact
strengthening state capacity is, (1) prescribed by global institutions such as the UN, IMF,
and World Bank, as well as (2) being a proud recipient of “aid” that will bring
development and eventually bring any nation up to universal standards.
The nation building approach by the state itself, has, as Ferguson describes it,
created this “new paradigm in the study of African politics in the 1980’s” that firstly,
discovers the local base as a prime location for civil society, and secondly, that the
“state” (with its economic, political, military, and societal suffocation and domination) is
actually the main obstacle for democratization and development. The state has since been
recognized as an obstacle for change, or an entity too big to change the lives of the local.
The local is now perceived as no longer incapable, as tribal, backward, (or whatever
typical colonial rhetoric that demonizes the “other”) and whatever tribal tendencies the
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local population were committed to then are now understood as community organizing,
grass root organizations, as opposition, as the new class of civil society set to tango with
the state for more space and eventually for increases in societal progress- Ferguson
exclaims, “For the state-and-society paradigm sees development not as the project of a
developmentalist state, but as a societal process that is held back by the stifling hold of
the state” (Ferguson, 2007: 97). While it seems that the state is in fact a major obstacle
for democratization and development, the misconception of civil society representing ‘the
local’, opposition, or grassroots organizations must be elaborated on. Civil society has
become a major recipient of foreign “aid” as it is constructed to appear to be something
that it is not. In Africa’s post-colonial context, the African state re-admits former
colonial powers into the state as development advisors, diplomatic professionals, and the
role models of civility.
I will proceed by making a few points regarding the controversial nature of the
vertical topography of power in the “developing” nation context of Egypt.
Firstly, it implies that the state (government) is an all-encompassing force that rules from
above and holds ultimate power. This is not the case when there is a heavy presence of
foreign government development agencies, WB, IMF, as well as the plethora of INGOs.
Secondly, it is implied that the “Bottom” is made up of grass-roots organizations, which
represent the local and should be empowered to challenge state hegemony and hold
governance accountable. Thirdly, the vertical topography of power states that everything
in between the state and the family is civil society- the place where state and people can
meet, discuss, and initiate action. There has to be a distinction and differentiation
between the “sandwiched” space between the “top” and “bottom” as my research has
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shown, civil society is not simply one area of democratic space. There are levels of the
supposed civil society sector that signify major disconnections between CSOs. For
instance, transnational organizations have bilateral agreements with government and
therefore work side by side with the state. This counters the assumption that the state was
on the “top”, when in fact transnational organizations and foreign governments either
work on the same level of the state, carrying out similar if not the same functions as
government, and in some cases work above the state. In a complete contrast, there are
grassroots organizations that are not registered, are not legal, are not considered civil
society (at least when it comes to policy and funding) yet work to advocate and promote
individual rights while holding government accountable. Rather than an existing space
where these levels can associate and work together, the space is divided, with clear
distinctions of “level of power”. What I am suggesting is that 1.) The vertical topography
of power does not indicate various levels of power- including showing that supposed
CSOs work on the same level as the state, as Ferguson suggested, and that the topography
of power should include a ladder- indicating rungs of power. 2.) Just as Ferguson
proclaimed, verticality should be transformed into a horizontal topography that more
precisely presents the “real” power dynamics of the state.
Transforming the vertical topography of power into a “horizontal ladder” is
necessary for showing the various levels of power between the “state” and the “family”
as well as presenting the argument that transnational and government organizations work
on the same level as the “state”. The rungs of the ladder indicate the levels within civil
society, showing a lack of connection between civil society actors and grassroots
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organizations, while showing the closeness between certain civil society actors and
government.
What this analysis and “horizontal ladder” ultimately provides and indicates is
research that is consistent with several major discrepancies of Egyptian civil society.
When it comes to INGOs they are confused as to whether they are a part of civil society
while some claim they are very much a part of the sector. They are funded by foreign
governments and work only with legitimate local NGOs that are government approved
and regulated, disconnecting them from much of civil society. Foreign government
entities and their affiliates are directed and funded by a foreign government agenda that
wants to exert influence over the country. They work with INGOs, government,
legitimate local NGOs and private industry, basically strengthening political society with
socio-economic aid. They work close enough to the state level that, besides differences in
nationality, you could hardly distinguish who is who. There are local NGOs that receive
funding from local and foreign government, are highly regulated, and mostly intervene
within the socio-economic realm while paying little attention to political development.
These organizations are sustained by USAID and other foreign funding as long as there
are shared interests over a developmental issue. These dominating forces either claim to
be civil society or claim to empower the sector, although interestingly, none of the
previously mentioned forces work for political development nor do they engage with
broader civil society forces to hold government accountable and apply pressure (trade
unions, grassroots organizations, advocacy groups, activists, initiatives). This leaves us
with the activists, the ‘street’, and leaders of initiatives who all receive little to zero
funding internally or externally. They have little to zero contact with INGOs or USAID
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while their contact with local NGOs is limited, mostly because local NGOs deal with
short term economic issues such as charity and do not involve themselves in the political
realm. This group includes what may appear to be the civil society seen so often in
contemporary literature. They are politically active and engaged individuals, they
advocate for issues that are central to average Egyptians and they willingly challenge the
state and their security forces. However, these groups of active citizens are not formally
considered civil society and therefore are not the beneficiaries of the millions of dollars
that is committed to civil society by transnational organizations and foreign governments.
Next to be introduced is an original civil society model that is intended to bring to
light the nature of Egyptian civil society and the roles of CSOs. The model uses a
horizontal approach placing CSOs on a scale of political activity. At the same time the
model will indicate the international and local nature of these organizations. This is an
attempt to show the level of political activity by CSOs while simultaneously showing
whether an organization is “local” or “foreign”. This model is different than the
“horizontal ladder”, inspired by Ferguson and Dr. Bartlett, because it does not present the
state’s topography of power.
Less Local INGOs

CSO Model
Grassroots ‘informal’ CS

Less Political

Local NGOs

More Local

More Political

The model indicates several aspects concerning civil society actors. Firstly, there
is a trend that shows that the more an individual or group of civil society is political the
more local they happen to be. As civil society actors become less local there is an
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inclination to be less political and therefore not fulfilling the necessary functions of civil
society in theory. Foreign government donors who provide socio-economic aid do not
involve themselves within “national politics” and therefore do not promote political
development; they are at the same time the least political and the most international.
International and local NGOs are similarly limited in their political nature however they
obviously differ when it comes to their origins, one is less local and the other more local.
Initiatives, activists, the “street” happens to be the most political and the most local,
giving way to the idea that grassroots organizations are the most “local” and
“indigenous” while having the most interest in challenging state hegemony. What can
also be included in this diagram is the revolutionary social movement that led to the
ousting of former President Mubarak. They represent a large bloc of the “local” that is the
most politically engaged and interested in challenging governance.
The results of this model and research show that the formal space for civil society
is a completely dried up arena with little political activity (the hallmark of civil society
actors). Formal local or international organizations will not rock the boat, will do limit
government questioning because they work often work side by side with them, ensuring
limited political activity. They have limited interaction with active organizations, and are
more or less perpetuating the status quo and allowing the same power structure of
authoritarian rule. However, underneath the dried up arena of “formal” civil society,
which offers little hope for challenging the “political”, there lays a vibrant, active, and
fertile arena for CSO’s on the “ground” that listen to the heartbeat of the street. This civil
society is either ignored by the state and by the majority of the “formal” arena or seen as
a threat to state hegemony.
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Political Cartoons: PostRevolution

126

Ex President Mubarak (right) and ex Field Marshall Tantawi (left)
Tantawi says, “Why don’t you leave already?”
Mubarak says, “Why just me?”
December 26, 2011
Private daily newspaper: Al Masry Al Youm

“They took Aldo (police) and brought
Shaheen (army)”
Note the one hand with the police and two
hands bringing the army.
This is in reference to the supposed ‘external’,
foreign hand that the government claims to
have been involved in the revolution.
December 26, 2011
Private daily newspaper: Al Masry Al Youm

“Oh gosh, I forgot the name of the guy
I came to vote for”
In reference to lack of education and
individuals that were paid to vote
during elections
May 16, 2012
Private daily newspaper: Al Masry Al

Youm

The Martyrs (angels) of the January
25th revolution speaking with the
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Martyrs from clashes on Mohamed Mahmoud Street
“Ha ha you look new, I feel bad. Who’s going to get you your rights? They haven’t
brought our rights (truth) yet”
December 26, 2011
Private daily newspaper: Al Masry Al Youm

Ministry of Interior asks for return of
the emergency law
Monster is Emergency Law
Zookeeper (army) says, “Look at this
refined animal, aren’t you
embarrassed from being so harsh on
him?”
September 3, 2012
Private daily newspaper: Al Masry Al
Youm

Headline: After Morsi’s latest decisions
Security says, “He’s telling you go and
buy him new suits because the old ones
don’t fit him anymore”
In reference to President Morsi’s
transformation being in a position of
power- Morsi is flexing
August 14, 2012
Private daily newspaper: Al Masry Al
Youm
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Man flips coin for Egypt’s future, “heads
or tails (religious or civil)”
Man catches the coin with the face of the
army on it: “I should have predicted the
results on my own”
May 17, 2012
Private daily newspaper: Al Masry Al
Youm

Law written to reconcile with
investors was amended
Rich businessmen walk out of jail
with their money and say bye to
military (in reference to deals made
with them)
Rich man flips a coin to the poor
man, “here, splurge on yourself”
May 17, 2012
Private daily newspaper: Al Masry
Al Youm

Army general checking his eye
sight
Letters spell ‘revolution’
Army general does not see
‘revolution’ and only sees
handcuffs
June 7, 2012
Private daily newspaper: Al Masry
Al Youm

129

A women in parliament is
asking to cancel the law
against harassment
Women hold sign that says,
“No to harassment of women,
whether alive or dead (in
reference to the proposed law
to allow men to sleep with
their wives within eight hours
of their death)”
One woman asks, “She
doesn’t have sisters?”
May 17, 2012
Private daily newspaper: Al
Masry Al Youm

“Go ahead and vote,
finish this already. The
meal is waiting for the
oil, the rice, and the gas
tank”
In reference to the
necessity for a president
as there continues to be
limited supplies for staple
products
May 17, 2012
Private daily newspaper:
Al Masry Al Youm
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Four papers read: 1) Morsi the
Brave, 2) Morsi who embarrassed
Iran, 3) Morsi is inspired by God, 4)
Raise your head high, you are
Morsi! (In reference to the wellknown chant: Raise your heads high,
you are Masry (Egyptian))
Man in the middle proclaims, “I
know we are not an Industrial
nation, but our line of production of
pharaohs is going very well”

September 3, 2012
Private daily newspaper: AlShorouk
Morsi before his presidency:
“There is no pencil that will lose
it’s lead in my era”
Morsi tells the beaten man: “the
most important thing is that the
pencil is ok?”
August 14, 2012
Private daily newspaper: Al
Masry Al Youm

Police officer says, “you stole
laundry and you want to get out
for free, why? Do you think you
are the killer of the
demonstrators?”
In reference of the acquittals for
police officers responsible for the
death of protesters
June 7, 2012 Private daily
newspaper: Al Masry Al Youm
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Discussion:
In this section I make the necessary connections between the literature and
research in order to discuss the results as well as their implications on both civil society
literature, civil society under authoritarian rule and specifically Egyptian civil society. It
is important to gather all of these thoughts, the literature, and research to discuss the
recurring themes of this complex sector.
What does the literature show?
The literature provides a necessary background for the principles, purpose and
role of the state and civil society. Without reviewing the classical definitions and
interpretations of the state and civil society, let’s first discuss the transformation of state
and civil society from the “nation-building” to the “state-society” paradigm. The “nationbuilding” process understands the state as being the ultimate constructor of the modern
nation state. The “state” is seen as a modern, highly rational, system of territorial
organization while “society” is backwards, unorganized, and incapable. The “state” on
the national level is a centralized authority that rules its citizens within the state,
emphasizing the importance of requiring citizenship throughout society. The “state” is an
enabler of democracy and can develop their nation with the help of aid from the
international community. In the state-society paradigm the roles are reversed. The image
now depicts the “state” as backwards, unorganized, and incapable of providing the space
for society to flourish and ultimately develop the nation. “Society” on the other hand is
seen as a place for investment or new possibilities because of the overbearing rule of the
state in the socio-economic and political spheres. The “local”, once understood as
backward and rural, are now seen as enablers, dynamic, and held back by “state” power.
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It is at this point where civil society officially becomes relevant, as a “buzz” word, for
describing various social movements and the societal struggle against authoritarian
regimes towards the end of the Cold War era. Civil society has since become nearly
synonymous with “democracy” and has taken on the role of being an enabler for
democratic principles.
The previous decades show that the Western academic world is certainly content
with the simplistic understanding that civil society is solely a voluntary, grassroots, and
dynamic sector of society that is needed to challenge and apply pressure on the state.
Research has since been dedicated towards the work of civic organizations with the rise
in social movements proving that the state needed to be rolled back. In terms of funding
with “development” and “aid”, these dynamics have also changed along with the
evolution of state and civil society. “Development” is seen in both paradigms, going from
being the project of the state to a natural social process that is actually thwarted by the
overbearing rule of the state. The belief that the state disables development along with the
growing support for civil society by academia and transnational organizations (UN, WB,
and IMF) is made evident by the creation of pro-civil society policies and the allocation
of funds towards these policies. Development has now become an industry, made up of a
network of international non-governmental organizations, transnational organizations and
corporations that work to implement development projects in nations willing to undergo
the neoliberal process (structural adjustment programs). Civil society has since become a
major focal point for development agencies and is generally the target audience for the
industry to fund and ultimately empower. Civil society has been funded and supported
for years in nations worldwide, using the key terms of civic engagement and NGO
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capacity building, and it is clearly seen as a key to democratization and applying pressure
on the state. However, how close is civil society in reality to the civil society that is so
actively discussed and written about in Western academia and government policy?
The following section will highlight and discuss the research findings for my
questioning of Egyptian civil society in an attempt to provide the reality of state-society
relations for Egypt and other authoritarian states in the “developing” world.
What did the research find?
Research consisted of interviews conducted with the major social forces of
society. These social forces were namely, local NGOs, international NGOs, USAID and
development contractors, as well as activists that work on the “street” level. The
interview process consisted of several questions regarding civil society, with a few key
questions wondering what each interviewee thought of civil society in Egypt, their
definition, and their organization’s interaction with government. While civil society is
often understood as a dynamic network of grassroots, voluntary, actors only the activists
and their informal organizations function as the civil society as we have come to
understand. My research has therefore concluded that civil society in Egypt is not what it
seems in Western academia and government policy.
Local NGOs are heavily regulated by government and therefore are mostly
involved in the socio-economic sphere, avoiding the political realm altogether in fear of
receiving negative attention from government. Their attention is focused on health,
educational services, and charity, mostly in the form of short-term humanitarian aid.
These organizations receive funding from both government and foreign aid sources in the
form of transnational organizations and foreign government aid. Not only are all funds
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regulated and accounted for, projects are also subject to regulation and therefore have to
compliment the agenda of both national government and other donors. Still, not all local
NGOs are lucky enough to receive enough funding to sustain themselves and ultimately
are forced to alter their work according to the agendas of donors or, they cease to exist.
These organizations are at the helm of government and are unable to inspire long-term
development that can roll government back.
International NGOs are not subjected to quite as much government control
although funding and development projects are still regulated. Their work is also focused
in the socio-economic sphere although projects may indirectly affect their constituent’s
political development. INGOs work closely with certain local NGOs however the local
organizations must be legitimate according to the government and therefore are heavily
regulated. The government must approve of projects and funding as well as which local
organizations are involved. Some of the interviewees believed INGOs to be a part of
Egyptian civil society while others believed they were catalysts for civil society; certainly
there was an overall confusion. INGOs work with a long-term development agenda but
ultimately are forced to work within the limitations of government. Both local and
international NGOs work outside the political realm and are unable to create enough
space for civil society to have a broad effect on society, no thanks to government control.
USAID and development contractors, who clearly are not members of Egyptian
civil society still fund CSO’s and have an effect on Egyptian society. USAID is
American foreign aid paid to developing nations by American taxpayers and brought to
national governments and organizations by way of the State Department. Millions of
dollars are allocated for civil society in Egypt as the U.S. government hopes to support
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democratization in the Arab Republic. However, funding is either delivered to the
Egyptian government who therefore can decide which organizations to provide funds, or,
to INGOs that will ultimately utilize funding for their project partnerships with local
NGOs. In both scenarios funding is provided to organizations that are highly regulated,
that will not use the funds for challenging governance, and that are seen as legitimate by
government. Additionally, USAID projects are bilateral nearly seventy percent of the
time, as they work hand in hand with the Egyptian government. The U.S. ultimately is
interested in Egypt’s stability as their interests in the region depend on it. Stability in
Egypt means supporting organizations that will rarely or never question governance or
the status quo.
Activists on the other hand serve a much different purpose than the previously
mentioned forces of society. Of the four individuals that were interviewed, all of them are
involved in informal organizations, work voluntarily, occasionally involve themselves
with local NGOs but are weary of their capabilities, have limited to zero contact with
INGOs or foreign governmental aid, and consider themselves to be affiliated with social
justice issues focused on improving governance. One woman is involved in an informal
organization called an “initiative” that voluntarily brings together young leaders with
likeminded beliefs who want to develop society’s awareness and activity but specifically
want to avoid government controlled NGOs and development agencies. Even receiving
funding from abroad, whether it be from USAID, the EU, or Qatar, is looked down upon
for fear that their image will be tainted in the eyes of the people. Most of these
individuals met during the Egyptian Revolution on January 25th 2011 and believe the
government to be a roadblock to their efforts. The work these individuals take part in is
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“pure civil society”, the definition seen in contemporary literature, which is a grassroots
effort to rally and organize large numbers of the population to put pressure and challenge
government’s overbearing authority.
What the results prove is that there is a dominant, formal, public, official, and
legitimatized civil society that is promoted by transnational organizations, a dense
network of INGOs, Western academics and government policy, that has turned out to the
opposite purpose of what civil society should strive for. This civil society is not the
dynamic, bustling, innovative and grass root sector of society that will push forward
efforts for democratization in Egypt. This civil society is regulated by an authoritarian
regime, often works closely with government, and still receives millions of dollars
specifically geared towards various elements of democratization. Using the funds of
external governments and affiliate transnational organizations like the WB and IMF, this
public imposter we know as civil society cooperates with the national government of
Egypt to impose Western development and neoliberal policies. While this paper does not
specifically question the intentions of the neoliberal agenda, it is astonishing that the
Egyptian government pre and post revolution comfortably receives funding though there
are is no indication that governance has improved domestically. In fact, the country has
slowly worsened due to the lethal combination of structural adjustment programs and
unemployment that culminated with an uprising that dethroned the former president in
2011. With the current President Morsi the same domestic problems linger and yet there
seems to lack the necessary inner questioning by transnational organizations of their own
funding and appear willing to continue the same development practices as was agreed
with the previous regime.
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The research also proves is that there is an underground, informal civil society
that is dynamic, organized, and grassroots, similar to the civil society described by
academics and government policy. It turns out that informal civil society is not weak,
small or incapable, only weakened by the fact that they are not legitimate due to the
nature of their work and therefore receive little in funding or support from national or
foreign governments. Furthermore, they are considered by government sympathizers to
be “the opposition”, the “tyrants of the revolution” the backwards “other” that is
destabilizing the nation. With all of this applied pressure, the proof of their strength is
clearly evident by the results of the revolution, with turnouts of over a million strong, the
use of well-practiced nonviolent tactics against an armed and equipped security force and
the current mobilizing activity on the ground against the new Morsi regime.
The research is consistent with the domestic issues that have plagued the Arab
Republic over the past decades. There has been a visible “public” civil society promoting
policies that were government regulated within the same timeframe that have not resulted
in democratizing the state, in fact, the military dictatorship had been hardly impenetrable
up until the uprising that saw millions of Egyptians call for an end to despotic,
aristocratic rule. “Informal” civil society instead decided to take development into their
hands, as the revolution may be the greatest attempt at a social and political revolution in
modern Egyptian history, without the help of ‘formal’ civil society.

Implications:
What are the implications of these state dynamics for the African and Middle
Eastern context? What first must be recognized is the disparity between civil society in
the “developing” world in comparison with the “developed”.
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Funding should not be guaranteed to authoritarian governments with little interest
in real democracy. These funds actually strengthen “formal” civil society, which
ultimately acts to strengthen stability in government rather than alter their deeply flawed
mode of governance. Leakages of aid facilitate corruption, allowing government to
support and allocate funds to whichever organization they approve all the while the
power dynamics, status quo, and the state’s involvement continues as it always had been.
Continued support towards “formal” civil society simultaneously strengthens government
while weakening “informal” civil society. Civil society in “developing” nations becomes
a tool for both external and internal manipulation. It is a tool for the state as they can
regulate “change” for Egypt, ensure political power remains stable and create the
appearance of “development” by allowing NGOs to exist but with heavy regulations and
control over their work and effectiveness. All at the same time promoting
“democratization” by allowing transnational organizations and Western government to
play a major role within its development process. It is utilized by external forces
(transnational organizations and international government) because Egypt becomes
westernized, can shape and remodel the nation according to neo-liberal policies, can
bring Egypt into a global economy, can ensure western interests are intact, and allows a
certain degree of control over the state. All at the same time promoting democracy and
socio-economic development though not questioning governance, creating space for
“informal” civil society, or applying pressure for real, tangible political development.
“Informal” CSOs continue to grow where civil society is the purest, in the street.
The Egyptian street, commonly regarded as the bustling birthplace for the revolution, is
the site of where every day trials and tribulations are most evident. The street is where
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acquaintances become friends, for transactions to be made, and where the majority of the
population spends its time struggling to survive. Nevertheless, “informal” civil society
has a lot of intended and unintended enemies, none more daunting than the government
apparatus. This sector applies pressure nearly daily, as there are protests and campaigns
that are organized in public squares with the intention of creating awareness and
promoting democratic principles through an outreach method unparalleled by ‘formal’
CSOs.
The dynamics of power within the state should be more closely scrutinized as
civil society continues to be misinterpreted by its leading promoters. “Formal” civil
society may be capable of re-writing their fate by developing new methods of outreach to
informal CSOs in an attempt to further their understanding of society. If their government
counterparts do not approve, then the necessary job of holding the Egyptian national
government accountable for not allowing the seeds of democracy to grow will be
addressed on a state level. If government does not approve and no longer appreciates the
work of ‘formal’ civil society, then they can step aside for ‘informal’ civil society to
regain this space and legitimately challenge the imperious rule of government. Either
support “informal” CSOs, pure civil society, with the necessary funding or get out of
their way and allow them to regain space from political society in the grassroots, dynamic
manner it is supposed to serve and develop Egyptian society.
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APPENDIX I:
(NGO Law 84, 2002 is not available online) Legal Analysis According to The
International Center for Not-For-Profit Law (ICNL):
“Organizational Forms
Law 84 of 2002 allows for the creation of associations, foundations (i.e, nongovernmental institutions), and unions. In addition, not-for-profit companies can be
established by virtue of provisions in the Egyptian Civil Code and Corporate Code.
According to Law 84 of 2002, an association is a “group with a formal structure
continuing for a definite or indefinite period and formed by natural or juridical persons,
or both together, whose number is not less than ten in all cases, for a purpose other than
gaining physical profit.” (Article 1)
A foundation or non-governmental institution is established where a fund is designated
for a definite or indefinite period of time, for the realization of a purpose other than
profit. (Article 56)
[The remainder of this report will focus on associations, as the association is
overwhelmingly the most common organizational form.]
Public Benefit Status
Associations pursuing “general interest” purposes may be recognized as “associations of
public benefit” by presidential decree, upon the request of the association or of the
government-controlled General Union for Associations and Non-Governmental
Institutions (Foundations). (Articles 48, 49) The criteria for attaining public benefit
status are not clearly defined and the President’s decision not clearly guided by objective
standards. According to Article 49:
All association visualizing the realization of a general interest upon or after its
foundation may be vested with the quality of public benefit, by decree of the President of
the Republic, upon the request of the association, or of the administrative authority or the
General Union for Associations and Non-Governmental Institutions, and the approval of
the association in both cases.
According to Article 51 of Law 84 of 2002, public benefit organizations have access to
direct government funding. In practice, many public benefit organizations have close
political links to the ruling party or President.
Barriers to Entry
Law 84 of 2002 includes of a number of legal barriers to the establishment of
associations. First, the law requires that all associations be registered in order to operate;
in other words, informal [unregistered] associations are prohibited. Second, the law
includes vague grounds for denial of registration, thereby inviting subjective and arbitrary
government decision-making. Registration can be refused if the association’s purposes
“threaten the national unity” or run “against public order and public attitude." As
demonstrated recently, the Ministry has used these grounds to deny registration; the
associations Egyptians against Discrimination and Old Egyptians for Human Rights were
denied registration in January 2008 and May 2009, respectively. Third, many
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international NGOs seeking to establish branch offices in Egypt have faced great
difficulty in doing so.
Barriers to Operational Activity
Barriers to operational activity in Egypt take the form of governmental interference in
internal affairs, vague grounds for dissolution, the imposition of harsh sanctions, and
extra-legal harassment by security authorities.
First, Law 84 of 2002 expressly authorizes the Government to interfere in the internal
affairs of associations. Specifically:
• The administrative authority has the right to call a General Assembly meeting
(Article 25);
• The association must send a copy of the papers tabled before the General Assembly
to the administrative authority at least 15 days before convening the Assembly
(Article 26);
• The association must provide the administrative authority with a copy of the minutes
of the General Assembly meeting within 30 days from the meeting (Article 26);
• The Minister of Social Affairs may appoint acting members of the Board of
Directors where there are insufficient members to hold a meeting (Article 40);
• The Minister may also dissolve the board of directors if the board has not convened
a meeting of the General Assembly for two consecutive years (Article 42).
Second, the law includes vague grounds for dissolution, thereby inviting subjective and
arbitrary decision-making on dissolution decisions. Vague grounds include:
• Subscribing to or joining any club, organization, society or authority outside Egypt
without first information the administrative authority; and
• Threatening the national unity or public order or public attitude.
Third, Egyptian law makes harsh sanctions – including imprisonment – available for
violations of the law. Conducting activities as an unregistered association, conducting
activities that threaten the national unity, and receiving foreign funds without prior
governmental approval are all examples of violations that could lead to the imposition of
sanctions, including imprisonment.
Finally, the security apparatus in Egypt is infamous for interfering with associational
activity.
Barriers to Speech / Advocacy
Egyptian law prohibits all “political activities” of NGOs. Regulations indicated that
prohibited political activities include “advocating the program of one of the political
parties, contributing to electoral campaigns, and putting forth candidates for office.”
(Regulations to Law No. 84/2002 on Associations and Non-Governmental Institutions
(Article 25)). The Egyptian Government, however, does not distinguish between a
political campaign for office and public policy activities. One example is the case of the
Egyptian Association Against Torture. The Administrative Judiciary Court refused to
register the association on December 15, 2005 because the court decided that the group’s
mission to pressure the government to eliminate torture in police stations and prisons was
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“political activity”; consequently, the association was prohibited from launching its
activities.
Criminal defamation is also used to silence critics of Egypt’s Government. Saad Eddin
Ibrahim, one Egypt’s leading human rights and democracy activists, was arrested,
prosecuted and imprisoned in 2000 for, among other things, allegedly “defaming Egypt’s
image abroad” – a violation of the Egyptian Criminal Code. His defense team claimed
that the real motive behind the Government’s prosecution was his outspoken criticism of
President Hosni Mubarak and his administration. Mr. Ibrahim was tried three times but
ultimately acquitted by the High Court of Justice in 2003 after substantial international
pressure was exerted on the Mubarak regime. Several years later, a series of hisba
lawsuits* were brought against Mr. Ibrahim by individual Egyptian citizens, and on
August 2, 2008, and Egyptian court sentenced Ibrahim to tow years imprisonment for
again “defaming Egypt,” this time under the hisba doctrine. At least a dozen additional
hisba cases remain pending against Mr. Ibrahim.
Barriers to International Contact
Egyptian law requires advance Ministry approval in order to join any organization or
society headquartered outside of Egypt. Egyptian authorities may prevent individuals
(including association representatives and civil society activists) from travelling outside
Egypt to participate in international conferences and meetings. Authorities may also
prevent representatives of international organizations from entering Egypt.
Barriers to Resources
Foreign Funding
Egyptian law prohibits any association from receiving foreign funds – whether from
foreign individuals or from foreign authorities (including their representatives inside
Egypt) – without advance approval from the Ministry of Social Solidarity. Securing
ministerial approval may require a two-month wait during which time the Ministry
reviews the request for approval. The failure to secure approval can lead to
dissolution. For example, on April 27, 2009, the Egyptian Organization for Human
Rights (EOHR) received a dissolution decree, alleging that the EOHR received foreign
funding without authorization; the dissolution order reportedly came soon after EOHR
published its 2008 Annual Report, criticizing the Egyptian Government. It should be
noted, however, that an Egyptian administrative court found in a prior case involving
another association that dissolution of an organization based on receipt of foreign funds
without prior approval is unconstitutional.
Sending funds from an Egyptian NGO to a natural or legal person abroad also requires
advance approval from the Ministry of Social Solidarity, except for scientific and
technical books, magazine, publications, and brochures. Law 84 applies the same
sanctions for sending and receiving foreign funding without government approval.
Domestic Funding
The barriers against foreign funding also apply to some categories of domestic funding.
Specifically, the law requires that associations seeking funds from Egyptian individuals
also secure advance approval from the Ministry. Presumably, the failure to do so carries
with it the same risk of dissolution.”
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